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Abstract: 
 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) have emerged in the last few decades as a 
mechanism for a state to overcome widespread, grave, human rights violations.  There are 
numerous approaches to a TRC all with an ultimate goal: that formerly warring factions, 
perpetrators, witnesses, and victims can move forward as a united people.  I propose that 
the provision of amnesty is critical to the success of a TRC.  I hypothesize that the form 
of amnesty chosen (i.e. blanket v. conditional amnesty) determines the revelation of truth 
and realization of justice, which in turn dictates whether a TRC can achieve 
reconciliation.  To test this hypothesis, I use two case studies: South Africa, which has 
utilized conditional amnesty, and Sierra Leone which has employed blanket amnesty.  I 
create a model for measuring reconciliation.  I can then look at the implications of both 
types of amnesty and assess which, in the end, is more effective.  My overarching 
conclusion is that the provision of conditional amnesty is more effective than blanket 
amnesty in achieving reconciliation.  Ultimately, I hope that this conclusion can be 
generalized to other TRCs. 
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 4 
Introduction 
“I am a farmer. My father is dead. I have no mother. I have two wives. I 
have six children. I live at S. The rebels came from K; they met me at S; I 
ran away. When I ran, my children left me; I was left behind. The rebels 
surrounded us. They catch us; six of us. They catch me; they tied me; they 
killed my companions. . . . They tied me on a post. When they are ready to 
go, they brought a bench. They said “Put your hand” and I said, “Oh 
God.” So they asked me, “Do you have a God?” . . . They cut off my hand. 
They cut off both of my hands. Then they left me there. I could not run too 
far, and I fell down. I cried. I said, “Oh God, I am finished for life. I am 
finished” (Kelsall 2005, 370). 
 
 The above is an excerpt of Sesay Ballah’s testimony given at the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Hearings in Tonkolili, Sierra Leone on July 8, 2003 (Kelsall 
2005, 370).  His story is comparable to so many other victims of human rights abuses all 
over the world.  The physical and psychological implications of what he has had to 
endure will stay with him, and forever impact his ability to be self sufficient.  Imagine 
this victim is you, or one of your parents, siblings, sons or daughters.  Imagine the 
perpetrator of these crimes is your neighbor, or another member of your community.  
Could you forgive them?  Could you release the desire for vengeance?  Would telling 
your story and hearing their apology be sufficient to let bygones be bygones?  These 
questions are paramount to a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) as they 
determine whether the revelation of truth, with a provision of amnesty, can really lead to 
reconciliation. 
A TRC is one method of a larger process called transitional justice.  Transitional 
justice is the process by which a society slowly recovers and moves forward after wide 
spread human rights abuses.  It marks a transition toward democracy.  “The challenge for 
a new democracy is to respond appropriately to past evils without undermining the new 
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democracy or jeopardizing prospects for future development” (Crocker 2000, 100).  
When new leaders replace a corrupt regime and make the choice to pursue transitional 
justice, many crucial decisions follow.  There are numerous tools of transitional justice, 
the most obvious of which is criminal prosecution.  The choice to prosecute often 
depends upon the severity of the crime, and compliance with international law (Siegel 
1998, 433).  Another approach is state sponsored reparations programs which can be 
offset financially by allowing civil suit against perpetrators.  Yet another choice is 
whether or not to establish a TRC.  I will focus my thesis on this final mechanism. 
Once the leaders of a transitional government decide to instate a TRC, they must 
make other choices regarding which tools are most effective in achieving a commission’s 
goal.  Where the TRC is held, and whether it travels around a state, will be important in 
terms of who gets to testify.  Whether the testimonies will be public or private may 
influence those who are testifying, with the general population as an audience.  The 
decision to grant amnesty and the form it takes also has significant implications.  A state 
may choose to work with a prosecution mechanism, or it may choose to give partial 
amnesty (to children or for minor crimes, for instance).  A state may give conditional 
amnesty in exchange for a certain expectation of truth, or it may choose to give blanket 
amnesty to all perpetrators.  This leads me to the question: does the provision of one type 
of amnesty or another undercut justice in a TRC, and as a result, inhibit reconciliation? 
 The final choice, of what extent to provide amnesty as a tool of a TRC, is the 
focus of my research.  There are such varying views of whether it is beneficial or 
detrimental, that I think it is crucially important to analyze through the use of a 
comparative case study.  I hypothesize that the form of amnesty chosen determines the 
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revelation of truth and realization of justice, which in turn dictates whether a TRC can 
achieve reconciliation.  To test this hypothesis, I will analyze two case studies: South 
Africa, which has utilized conditional amnesty, and Sierra Leone which has employed 
blanket amnesty.  I will create a model for measuring reconciliation.  I can then look at 
the implications of both types of amnesty and assess which, in the end, is more effective.   
At the conclusion of my data section it becomes apparent that South Africa, 
having utilized conditional amnesty, scores higher on the composite reconciliation score 
than does Sierra Leone; which granted blanket amnesty.  The provision of conditional 
amnesty, coupled with the South African TRC’s power to subpoena witnesses, provided a 
tangible incentive for perpetrators, victims, and witnesses to testify.  Sierra Leone did not 
offer such a concrete incentive and as a direct result, their collection of truth suffered.   
On the other hand Sierra Leone did an impressive job with their efforts toward restorative 
justice, a lesson from which South Africa could take some pointers.  Ultimately, I hope 
that this conclusion can be generalized to other TRCs in an effort to achieive the highest 
level of reconciliation. 
 
Literature Review 
 
There is a growing interest internationally in restorative justice, which seeks to 
provide peace for the victims of human rights crimes (Graybill and Lanegran 2004).  
From this motive comes the concept of a TRC.  According to the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “these commissions—officially 
sanctioned, temporary, non-judicial investigative bodies—are granted a relatively short 
period for statement-taking, investigations, research and public hearings, before 
completing their work with a final public report” (2006, 8).  My question is: does the 
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provision of amnesty undercut justice in a TRC, and in so doing, inhibit reconciliation?  
Or is it a beneficial tool for a commission to use?  There is a long history of debate 
revolving around amnesty.  In broaching this research, I will explore the goals of a 
commission, including what justice and reconciliation mean in this context; how a 
commission seeks to achieve reconciliation (i.e. the varying approaches TRC’s employ); 
and the pros and cons of the choice to utilize amnesty. 
 
 
Justice 
 
Truth itself does not inevitably lead to reconciliation.  Underlying the goal of 
reconciliation is the concept of justice.  It is necessary to address the different approaches 
to justice prior to defining reconciliation.  Justice is a relative term.  Its definition varies 
depending upon who is asked, and under what circumstances.  This could fall on a 
spectrum anywhere from the age old concept of “an eye for an eye,” to more formal legal 
action, to some sort of compensatory payment.  Two distinct approaches to justice define 
the boundaries of the spectrum: retribution and reparation (Lambourne 1999, 4).   
Retribution involves some sort of punishment for a perpetrator.  Elster 
investigates the concept of retributive emotions, those underlying emotions on the part of 
the victims which feed a desire for retribution (2006, 34-35).  He states that there are five 
contributing emotional factors: anger, two sources of indignation (one in response to 
observing unjust behavior, the second from observing the unjust fortune of an individual), 
contempt, and hatred.  Retributive emotions are generated through disapproval of both 
the actions of an actor, and their personal character.  In terms of justice, the question is 
whether or not these emotions can be resolved without retribution.  Retribution can take 
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the form of prosecution.  It can also act as deterrence for the future by means of 
establishing precedents that human rights violations will not go unpunished. 
Reparations, according to Hayner, involve a number of methods of redress, 
including “restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non 
repetition” (2001, 171).  Restitution is a form of compensation (generally monetary) 
which aims at making amends to the victims.  After widespread state conflict involving 
human rights abuses, the corresponding recovery will need to be both physical and 
mental.  Frequently the repercussions of being damaged both physically and 
psychologically are economic.  Though a financial sum cannot make up for the loss of a 
loved one, for example, it nonetheless provides assistance as a sort of symbolic apology.  
This is complicated in a TRC as sometimes there are amnesty provisions instituted by a 
past regime, in its own self interest, that intentionally do not allow for a case (either civil 
or criminal) to be brought against alleged perpetrators (Hayner 2001, 170).  That is not to 
say there are not other approaches to reparations.  A truth commission which effectively 
reveals the truth, a state which acknowledges responsibility, and perpetrators who 
apologize for their actions, all offer some form of satisfaction to the victims. 
 
Retributive v. Restorative Justice 
 All TRC’s have the choice of whether to pursue retributive or restorative justice.  
Which approach is most likely to contribute to reconciliation?  Restorative justice (which 
includes reparations and restitution) seems to place more emphasis on healing as a 
community rather than punishing an individual.  It embraces the sentiment of forgiveness 
and falls neatly into the Christian theology that some truth commissions, primarily South 
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Africa’s, have utilized.  By contrast, retributive justice is employed to avoid individuals 
taking it upon themselves to seek vengeance.  “Retribution motivates punishment out of 
fairness to those who have been wronged and reflects a belief that wrongdoers deserve 
blame and punishment in direct proportion to the harm inflicted” (Minow 1998, 12).   
One limit of retributive justice is that, in many cases, it will never be enough.  It 
cannot fix the damage done, and there is no way the punishment could be proportional to 
the crime.  Aukerman demonstrates a common concern regarding a cycle of revenge 
which could result from a retributive approach: “…nor does sympathy for the retributive 
victim’s desire that her wrongdoer suffer necessarily mean that such suffering is justified, 
or even morally right. As Nino argues, retributivism ‘presupposes that it is sometimes 
appropriate to redress one evil with another evil. However, when I add the evil of the 
crime to the evil of the punishment . . . my moral arithmetic leads me consistently to 
believe that we have ‘two evils’ rather than ‘one good’” (Aukerman 2002, 56).   
 Minow argues that if “the longer-term goals include avoiding cycles of revenge, 
social reintegration of at least lower-level perpetrators should be pursued.  In many 
circumstances, demonizing all on ‘that side’ means demonizing large segments of the 
society, including many individuals who believed they were acting for a larger good or 
who acted out of fear or who rationalized their conduct in other ways” (Minow 1998, 
121-122).  This brings up a second critique of retributive justice: the concept of blame 
and, as Aukerman (2002) puts it, character evaluations.  In large scale conflict, especially 
when there are human rights abuses on all sides, it is difficult to assign blame to an 
individual.  “The central premise of individual responsibility portrays defendants as 
separate people capable of autonomous choice—when the phenomena of mass atrocities 
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render that assumption at best problematic” (Aukerman 2002, 46).  For instance, an 
individual could be acting in the interest of safety for his family, or his career, especially 
in the case of lower-level perpetrators.  This does not excuse their actions, but it might 
make restorative justice a more appealing option, particularly when there are violations 
on all sides. 
 
Reconciliation 
According to K. Asmal, L. Asmal, and Roberts, reconciliation is the “ending of 
the divisive cycle of accusation, denial and counter-accusation; not a forgetting of these 
accusations and counter-accusations, but more a settling of them through a process of 
evaluation” (1996, 47).  This is a very simple and straightforward definition which, 
though a good starting point, does not begin to fully illuminate the vast debate 
surrounding it.  Slye requires more, calling for not only accountability, but also for a 
“human rights culture” whose members respect fundamental human rights (2000, 171).  I 
will address three significant issues surrounding the concept of reconciliation: how 
forgiveness factors into reconciliation, and the necessity of justice, and the necessity of 
truth. 
Forgiveness is part of the exchange between victims and perpetrators which leads 
to reconciliation in society.  In some cases it is seen as a responsibility of the victim, an 
expectation.  The emphasis put on forgiveness varies from region to region depending 
upon societal norms.  Communities strongly influenced by Christian theology such as 
South Africa are more likely to incorporate notions of forgiveness into their truth 
commission (Kelsall 2005).  There are other countries, however, such as Sierra Leone, in 
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which the notions of forgiveness are less culturally salient (Kelsall 2005).  Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu, who presided over South Africa’s TRC, advocated for the importance of 
forgiveness in reconciliation.  He employed the values of Ubuntu, and encouraged it as 
the only path to follow in South African’s TRC (Gibson 2004, 13).  Ubuntu is a 
philosophy that embraces social solidarity and restorative justice.  It calls for forgiveness 
to lead to peace and reconciliation (Gibson 2004, 263).  “As Desmond Tutu said in 1985 
when resisting apartheid’s reformist machinations, ‘it is the victims, not the perpetrators, 
who must say when things are better or not’” (R. Asmal, L. Asmal, and Roberts 1996, 
49).  By forgiving, the victims can acknowledge a change and begin the process of 
moving forward. 
There is opposition to this philosophy on the part of those who feel too much 
emphasis is put on forgiveness.  Wilson says “Ubuntu was ‘used to sell a reconciliatory 
version of human rights talk to black South Africans’” (Graybill 2002, 359).  He is not 
alone in his concern that the victims carry the burden of reconciliation and are 
stigmatized if they don’t accept apologies and relinquish anger or desire for retribution 
(Graybill 2002; Graybill and Lanegran 2004). 
A related debate in defining reconciliation is the question of how justice factors 
in.  Is it a necessary component?  Advocates of forgiveness and Ubuntu, may indeed not 
desire retributive justice, but what of restorative justice?  Former UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan stated, "There are times when we are told that justice must be set aside in the 
interests of peace. It is true that justice can only be dispensed when the peaceful order of 
society is secure. But we have come to understand that the reverse is also true: without 
justice, there can be no lasting peace" (Annan, 2003).  Justice is a necessary component 
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of differentiating between the goals of an old corrupt regime, and the goals of a new one.  
“Truth commissions, in general, and the TRC, in particular, purport to be attempts to 
balance the independent forces of both justice and reconciliation.  If the priority is simply 
to bring past offenders to book, to demonstrate respect for the rule of law, and to mark off 
the new democracy from its unjust predecessor, then trials seem to be the obvious 
mechanism to adopt” (Allen 1999, 320).  TRC’s are created with a different purpose from 
trials: TRC’s do aim to bring peace and reconciliation through truth, and do not simply 
depend on retributive measures.  Minow supports this latter notion that retributive and 
restorative justice should coexist, and argues that reconciliation should be achieved in 
tandem (Graybill and Lanegran 2004, 5).   
 Finally, there is the consequence of truth for reconciliation.  On one end of the 
spectrum, it is argued that truth is of primary importance.  At minimum, partial truths 
offer something to the families of human rights victims.  “Even imperfect truth 
commissions produce a wealth of previously unknown information” which in itself can 
lead to a sense of closure for the victims and their families (Tepperman 2002, 139).  
On the other end of the spectrum, the import of truth is questioned all together and 
potentially displaced by the ritual of truth-telling in an effort to lead to reconciliation.  
Hayner suggests that the ritual of truth telling consists of simply allowing victims to give 
their testimony as the act in itself may be intrinsically cathartic and sufficient for 
reconciliation (2001).  “By speaking of trauma, survivors regain lost worlds and lost 
selves” (Minow 2000, 243).  Making this private experience public can also be cathartic 
to those who are an audience for the proceedings (whether they are a victim, or not).  
Minow hypothesizes that TRC’s humanize the perpetrators and empower the victims so 
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that everyone becomes human again, a necessary condition for reconciliation (2000, 254).  
Kelsall focuses on the truth commission of Sierra Leone and questions the necessity of 
truth itself.  He argues there are many reasons the truth was withheld, yet the process 
continued.  It culminated in a “staged ceremony of repentance and forgiveness” which he 
concludes was successful in achieving its original goal of reconciliation despite its 
failures in exposing the truth (2005, 380).   
Wilson disagrees with the acceptance of an incomplete truth, but believes truth is 
the key to reconciliation (2001).  He cites Benedict Anderson, who argues, “The 
formulation of a shared national past is simultaneously the basis of the assertion of a 
shared national future” (Wilson 2001, 14).  In other words, truth is a prerequisite for 
reconciliation.   
 
Amnesty 
 Forgiveness, justice, and truth are all aspects of reconciliation to varying degrees, 
as explained above.  But there is one decision concerning how a TRC is designed which 
can either help or inhibit reconciliation: namely, how a commission wants to utilize 
amnesty.  According to Black’s Law Dictionary, amnesty is most simply “a pardon 
extended by the government to a group or class of persons, for a political offense” 
(2004).  It is understood that “forgiveness is deemed more expedient for the public 
welfare than prosecution and punishment” (Black’s Law Dictionary 2004).   
Some might argue that forgive-and-forget is the best policy, that condoning 
“amnesia” as the best way to move forward as a country (Graybill and Lanegran 2004, 
1124).  Graybill (2004) identifies three different approaches to amnesty and elaborates 
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each of them with accompanying case studies.  The first is “pardon” (as in the case of 
South Africa) involving conditional amnesty.  Here, amnesty may be granted in exchange 
for full disclosure of the truth on the part of the perpetrator (R. Asmal, L. Asmal, and 
Roberts 1996, 16).  The second is “punishment” (as in the case of Rwanda) where 
traditional, local courts (called Gacâca courts) are established to try perpetrators.  Finally 
“amnesia” (in the case of Mozambique) involves collective forgetting.  When deciding 
whether to hold a TRC, the transitional government in Mozambique determined that 
publicly airing grievances would lead to more conflict and that collective amnesty for all 
sides was the best way to leave the past behind (Graybill and Lanegran 2004).   
In addition, there are also “blanket and “self” amnesty approaches.  The case of 
Mozambique is one form of “blanket amnesty”.  A prior regime may also establish a 
provision of “self-amnesty” which protects the regime’s leaders when they are no longer 
in power (Young 2002, 216).  Taking into consideration these approaches to amnesty, I 
will explore whether the provision of differing types of amnesty undercuts justice or truth 
and, in turn, inhibits reconciliation.   
 
Amnesty and justice 
 R. Asmal, L. Asmal, and Roberts support the idea that “the looming threat of 
criminal prosecution in the ordinary courts would furnish an incentive for perpetrators to 
approach [a truth] commission on a voluntary basis and seek reconciliation through 
genuine contrition” (1996, 24).  They argue this is more advantageous for reconciliation 
than forcing perpetrators to testify in a retributive setting.  Markel agrees, and is willing 
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to sacrifice retributive justice, to some extent, in favor of the revelation of truth which is 
necessary for reconciliation and nation-building (1999, 391). 
 Theissen counters by questioning whether the provision of amnesty in fact aligns 
with international law, as it allows for human rights violations to go unpunished 
(Theissen 2004, 7).   Greenawalt agrees that amnesties given to people responsible for 
grave war crimes are in fact unjust, and argues further that those given for political 
reasons alone can also be considered unjust (2000, 195-196).  He points to the 
inconsistency in cases of TRC’s in which those who are responsible for serious crimes 
against humanity may be granted amnesty, while those responsible for unrelated but more 
minor crimes will likely be charged.  (This is a result of narrow TRC mandates which 
only provide amnesty for politically motivated crimes.) 
 
Amnesty and truth 
 There is a concern that amnesty does not in fact lead to the revelation of truth.  In 
the case of blanket amnesty, while there is no longer a risk of punishment, there is also no 
incentive to tell the truth.  Graybill and Lanegran discuss Sierra Leone’s blanket amnesty 
as a statement of forgiveness (2004, 10).  They question whether blanket amnesty alone 
would lead to reconciliation.  Even within the context of conditional amnesty, there are 
situations in which suspected perpetrators know there is not enough evidence against 
them to prosecute, and so feel no need to state the truth to the amnesty commission or to 
admit guilt (Graybill 2002, 70-71).  Others claim they do not remember what happened or 
blame the effects of trauma for gaps in their testimony (Graybill 2002, 73). 
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 Greenawalt views some form of amnesty as a prerequisite for an effective truth 
commission.  He hypothesizes that “political opponents, may provide the commission 
with necessary cooperation only if they are assured that they, and those they care about, 
will receive amnesty” (2000, 191).  He argues the effectiveness of a commission, and its 
ability to reveal truth, depends upon a provision of amnesty.  This is supported by Minow 
who argues that “the conditional amnesty process does not foreclose truth-seeking, but 
instead promotes it,” in reference to South Africa’s TRC (1998, 56).  Slye argues that 
there is a difference in how a perpetrator approaches a trial versus a truth commission.  In 
a trial, perpetrators invariably seek to evade liability and attempt to raise doubts about 
their culpability so as to avoid punishment.  In a truth commission with an amnesty 
provision, they are more active participants, and in the case of conditional amnesty it is in 
their best interest to convey the whole truth (2000, 173). 
  The concepts of truth, justice, amnesty, and reconciliation are all intertwined, and 
arguably codependent.  “The final document of the Chilean Rettig Commission states 
that, ‘only upon a foundation of truth [is] it possible to meet the basic demands of justice 
and to create the necessary conditions for achieving national reconciliation’” (Wilson 
2001, 13-14).  Amnesty can serve as a tool in augmenting truth and justice, which can be 
effective together (Sikkink and Walling 2007).  In answering my question of which form 
of amnesty best promotes reconciliation, I must first define reconciliation in terms of 
truth and justice. 
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Research Design 
Looking at the literature surrounding a TRC, there are numerous independent 
variables which could influence the prospects for reconciliation.  Some of these 
independent variables include: the international relationships that a country maintains, 
and whether other countries or NGO’s are contributing to their post conflict peace-
building process.  The government structure (before, during, and after conflict) is also 
important; it matters whether or not there is a new cast of leaders or significant overlap 
with those of the past regime.  A country’s economic structure and culture are also 
influencing factors.  All of these could affect the achievement of reconciliation.  For my 
thesis I will focus on one key independent variable, amnesty.  I will explore variation in 
the types of amnesty offered, and the effects of variation on reconciliation. 
My thesis analyzes the relationship between the blanket and conditional amnesty 
(i.e. independent variables), and the dependent variable, reconciliation, in the context of a 
TRC.  The research design will include a definition of each variable, and a hypothesis as 
to their relationships.  It will operationalize the definition of reconciliation and determine 
how it can be measured.  I will explore this relationship through analysis of two case 
studies of transitional justice: South Africa, and Sierra Leone.  Later I will explain why I 
chose these case studies, and the nature of my data.  Ultimately, I will analyze primary 
and secondary source data to determine whether my hypothesis (i.e. that the choice of 
amnesty directly affects the achievement of reconciliation) is supported or not, and some 
possible outcomes. 
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Independent variables: Forms of Amnesty 
Amnesty is one of an assortment of tools of transitional justice.  The purpose of 
amnesty in a TRC varies from commission to commission, depending upon the specific 
goals of the TRC.  For my purposes, I will focus on the two of the most widely debated 
forms of amnesty: blanket amnesty and conditional amnesty.   
Blanket amnesty can be established in two forms.  The first is known as self-
amnesty, in which a regime builds amnesty into the legal system in order to protect 
principals of the regime from any future prosecutions.  A clear example of this took place 
in Ghana, where the Rawlings administration “entrenched a self amnesty in the 1992 
Constitution which barred any legal measures from being taken against members of either 
the provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) or the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC), both military regimes headed by Rawlings himself” (Valji 2006, 10).  
The second is simply called blanket amnesty.  It generally involves the granting of 
unconditional amnesty to all individuals involved in politically motivated crimes 
regardless of affiliations, and without requiring anything in return.  It is instituted post 
conflict, in the belief that it will facilitate reconciliation.  Both Uruguay and Sierra Leone 
employ this form of amnesty “in order to bring lasting peace” to their country (Evenson 
2004, 737).   
Conditional amnesty, as its name suggests, gives full or partial amnesty in 
exchange for truth.  Truth is distilled from victim, perpetrator, and witness testimony in 
an effort to create a shared national history.  Amnesty is usually given as a reprieve from 
prosecution, but is often coupled with some form of reparations.  One approach to 
conditional amnesty was seen in Liberia, which has afforded amnesty to children and 
 19 
those responsible for more minor crimes.  Another is seen in South Africa, which has 
granted amnesty in exchange for full disclosure of crimes resulting from national conflict. 
This thesis explores whether one form of amnesty or another positively affects the 
prospects for reconciliation 
 
Dependent Variable: Reconciliation 
 Many debates exist surrounding the concept of reconciliation, and few scholars 
agree on one comprehensive definition.  Some emphasize truth, while others require 
justice, forgiveness, or simply an end to conflict.  In my view, each of these aspects is 
important; hence, I conclude that reconciliation is a process which involves forging a 
balance between truth and restorative justice after extensive internal conflict.  The two 
are not mutually exclusive, but rather are codependent if reconciliation is to be 
determined successful; they each offer crucial aspects.   
Truth consists of victims, witnesses, and perpetrators giving testimony and 
together reconstructing an accurate narrative of past events, i.e. a national historical 
record in the context of transitional justice (Wilson 2001, 14).  It also involves 
acknowledging responsibility (whether on the part of the state as a whole or on the part of 
the individual people).  Only by creating a process through which individual people can 
engage in truth-telling is a state able to rebuild itself after massive internal conflict. The 
collaboration of all sides is an important feature of reconciliation. 
The literature review outlined the debate between proponents of retributive justice 
and those of restorative justice.  In my definition of reconciliation, I emphasize a 
restorative approach.  Restorative justice is a collective effort towards healing as a 
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community.  It involves awarding reparations to the victims of previous abuse in an 
attempt to redress past wrongs.  Reparations consist of rehabilitation both for the victim 
(in terms of mental and physical assistance), as well as for the perpetrator (in an effort to 
ease them back into the community as a law abiding citizen).  Restorative justice also 
strives for non-repetition of abuse, based on learning from the past.  It is thus contingent 
on the revelation of truth and involvement of all groups in society.  A final characteristic 
of restorative justice is that perpetrators are required to provide restitution to their 
victims.  This could include monetary compensation for past offenses either by individual 
perpetrators, or the state; community service on the part of the perpetrator, so that they 
may contribute to the rebuilding of a nation; and contrition on the part of a perpetrator, 
who acknowledges responsibility.  
 
Model and Hypothesis: 
 Having defined two approaches to amnesty and having defined reconciliation, I 
can now lay out the causal relationship between the two concepts which I want to explore 
in this thesis.  I hypothesize that the decision of whether to utilize blanket amnesty or 
conditional amnesty (independent variables) will ultimately determine whether a TRC is 
successful or unsuccessful in achieving reconciliation (dependent variable).   
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 The following diagram presents a model of the independent variables and the four 
possible outcomes of the dependent variable: 
 
Figure: 1 
    Independent    Dependent 
Variables    Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Operationalize the Dependent Variable: 
My definition of reconciliation encompasses the realization of both truth and 
restorative justice.  Reconciliation is literally comprised of multiple inputs, as illustrated 
below: 
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Figure 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This model helps to break down necessary components of reconciliation.  The 
first component is truth.  To be effective, a TRC must elicit a high level of truth from 
participants.  This can be measured by characteristics of victim and perpetrator testimony.  
First and foremost is the quality of the information.  Does the information given actually 
constitute truth?  This is determined based upon whether testimony is corroborated by 
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others in the form of a fellow victim or perpetrator, a victim confirming a violation on the 
part of a perpetrator, or a perpetrator taking responsibility for the claim of a victim.  Truth 
also depends upon the scope/comprehensiveness of the information. Was there 
widespread public awareness of the TRC and the information is elicited?  Did everyone 
have a chance to testify who wanted to do so?  Was the mechanism itself accessible to the 
general population?  Answering “no” to any of these questions could result in the 
exclusion of a segment of the population from the process.  It is thus important that the 
opportunity for full and complete truth-telling is not restricted. 
The second component is justice, more specifically: restorative justice.  Its three 
subcomponents include: 1) rehabilitative efforts on behalf of both the victims and the 
perpetrators; 2) the guarantee of non repetition; and 3) restitution.  Rehabilitative 
measures will include whether or not a state has rehabilitation programs available for 
both the victim and the perpetrator.  Common rehabilitation programs include those 
geared towards the reintegration of child soldiers as well as ex-combatants; in addition to 
programs which teach life skills such as farming in an attempt to help a person to become 
more economically self sufficient. 
The guarantee of non repetition is demonstrated by successfully assembling the 
truth to illuminate past mistakes in order to avoid repetition in the future.  Additionally, a 
state taking responsibility for its actions and holding all perpetrators accountable can 
demonstrate a commitment to change.  It could also result from memorial efforts of the 
state which include acknowledging wrongs done, honoring the victims, and vowing to 
make a change.  These frequently include physical memorials, public art, or a day of 
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remembrance; and are most effective when created as a collaboration between victims, 
perpetrators, and witnesses. 
Restitution can be measured most easily in its monetary form, i.e. whether the 
state or individual perpetrators must pay compensation, how much, or with what 
frequency?  Other forms of compensation could be paid through community service, 
allowing the perpetrator to contribute a lasting benefit to the community, or to specific 
victims.  They could take the form of a perpetrator apologizing and publicly taking 
responsibility for his or her actions.   
The overall quality of justice can also be measured by public opinion of the TRC, 
both in reference to the composition of truth and in reference to a specific restorative 
justice program.  This could consist of approval rates of the TRC, expressions of public 
trust in the TRC, and opinions concerning the perceived success of the TRC.  A 
composite analysis of each of these measurements can help determine whether a high 
level of truth and justice results from the provision of certain types of amnesty and thus a 
high level of reconciliation.  
In order to apply this model to my case studies, I will rank each indicator of 
reconciliation on a scale from 1-3:  1 represents a low level of achievement of a given 
measurement, 2 a moderate level, while a score of 3 signifies a high level of achievement.  
I will then average the scores of each indicator under the respective truth and restorative 
justice categories to create a composite score for each category.  I will then average these 
two scores together to get a final number representing a particular case study country’s 
achievement of total reconciliation. 
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Data Sources 
 Now that I have operationalized the definition of reconciliation, I will clarify how 
I will gather my data for the measurements.  The comparable information which 
ultimately allowed me to choose my case studies was made available by the United States 
Institute of Peace (USIP).  This organization has compiled a database of forty-one TRC’s 
which include the name, date, background information, charter, mandate, report,  and 
findings (if available) of each TRC.  It is important to my research to look at the charter 
and mandate of the South African and Sierra Leonean TRC’s so as to recognize: the goals 
of each commission; their chosen approach toward amnesty; and the reasoning behind the 
choice of amnesty provision.  A review of the mandates also offers insight into how each 
commission approaches reparations.  The final report of each TRC also offers significant 
data in terms of findings as well as recommendations from the commission to the 
government.  Typically, a TRC’s final report will recommend a rehabilitation mechanism 
and a system of restitution for victims.  I will also analyze examples of the testimony 
given at the commissions by perpetrators and victims, as well as witnesses’ responses to 
these testimonies.   
 Notably, Sierra Leone’s TRC put forth a statistical appendix to its final report.  
This provides information about testimony given, as well as requests for restitution.  
Comparable information is found in South Africa’s final report, which includes the report 
of the amnesty committee reflecting upon the process and its achievements.   
 As indicated above, public opinion is also a good resource for judging the nature 
of justice.  The Campaign for Good Governance is an NGO in Sierra Leone which 
conducted a public opinion poll measuring perceptions of the government post conflict 
 26 
(including its accountability, and efforts toward peace and reconciliation, among other 
measures).  Additionally, the scholar Amadu Sesay conducted a public opinion poll in 
Sierra Leone, published in 2007.  South Africa’s public opinion data comes from 
Gibson’s extensive 2001 Truth and Reconciliation Survey which analyzes (but is not 
limited to) public approval of amnesty, acceptance and knowledge of the TRC, as well as 
perceived racial reconciliation.   
 
Case Studies 
 I selected my cases from among a large pool of TRC's.  According to the 
International Center for Transitional Justice, there are forty-one TRC’s, including several 
currently in progress.  Others occurred in the same state more than once (i.e. Chile, 
Ecuador, Germany, Nepal, Peru, Rwanda and Uganda).  Not all of these are officially 
defined as a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission”.  Choosing my two case studies was 
thus mostly a result of a process of elimination.  For one, I wanted a comparative set of 
case studies which were clearly defined as a truth and reconciliation commission.  The 
priority of goals became immediately apparent in the name of the commission.  (To name 
a few, South Korea’s commission is titled the Presidential Truth Commission on 
Suspicious Deaths, Uruguay’s is the Commission for Peace, and Guatemala’s is the 
Commission for Historical Clarification.  Others such as Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and 
Chile’s 2003 commission specify that they are investigative operations, while Ethiopia 
and Rwanda work with a prosecution mechanism.)  I thus limited the possibilities to 
strictly “truth and reconciliation commissions” as determined by their title, charter, and 
mandate.  Within this significantly smaller pool, I looked at only commissions which 
 27 
utilized either blanket amnesty or conditional amnesty.  (A few, including Ethiopia, 
Paraguay and Peru, feed testimonies into a prosecution mechanism.  The rest provide 
some option for amnesty.)  Furthermore, the countries selected for my comparative case 
studies needed to have completed their TRC with a public report.  My final pool for 
conditional amnesty consisted of Algeria, which mandated conditional amnesty, but the 
result of almost blanket, and South Africa which had a clear mechanism for amnesty 
provisions.  The pool for blanket amnesty was more expansive.  I first eliminated those 
such as Chile (2003-2005) and Ghana (2003-2004) which provided blanket amnesty for 
the purpose of self-amnesty.  From there I was left with Morocco, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Uruguay, and Sierra Leone.  I eliminated Uruguay as its provision of blanket 
amnesty is currently under review as unconstitutional.  I then chose Sierra Leone over the 
remaining two commissions as its final report was far more extensive than that of 
Morocco (2004-2005), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (2003-2007) is still facing 
a great amount of domestic unrest.  As a result, I will be analyzing South Africa’s 1995-
2002 Commission of Truth and Reconciliation, which employed conditional amnesty, 
and Sierra Leone’s 2002-2004 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which provided 
blanket amnesty. 
 It is important to qualify that in the field of transitional justice research, there is a 
disproportionate focus on the South Africa TRC.  Not only did it occur prior to the Sierra 
Leone TRC but it was widely publicized internationally and viewed as a model upon its 
creation.  To this day, many comparative case studies include South Africa.  Hence, data 
is more widely available on South Africa than on Sierra Leone.  For this reason my data 
for the South Africa case study utilizes more of the quantitative and primary sources 
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available while my data for Sierra Leone must rely on more qualitative and secondary 
sources. 
 
History: South Africa Conflict  
 
The racial conflict in South Africa begins in the 1600’s when the Dutch East India 
Company settled on the Cape of Good Hope.  The settlers jointly became known as the 
Afrikaner people.  For the following century, they expanded their territory as well as their 
numbers and the number of their slaves.  An extensive conflict over land ensued between 
the Afrikaners (also known as Trekboers, Dutch for wandering farmers) and the native 
Khoikhoi and San tribes.  Between the years of 1785 to 1795, Afrikaners extended further 
into the north and killed thousands of San people while taking roughly 700 people 
(primarily children) into custody to become slaves on Afrikaner farms (Gascoigne 
2001b). 
In 1795, a new conflict began to emerge: the British took control of Cape Town.  
By this point the Afrikaners, relative to the English, were more indigenous to the region 
and rejected British rule.  They also opposed the British parliament’s new law abolishing 
the slave trade.  These emerging cultural differences led to what became know as the 
“Great Trek” of Afrikaners who traveled north into the Zulu tribe’s region (South Africa, 
U.S. State Department).  In 1852 and 1854 two Boer republics were created from among 
the Trekboer people: the Orange Free State and Tansvaal.  Their already rocky 
relationship with the English could not withstand the 1870 discovery of diamonds 
followed by the 1886 discovery of gold in Boer territory (South Africa, U.S. State 
Department).  The English invaded, thereby prompting the Anglo-Boer Wars.  The 
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British emerged victorious and incorporated the two Boer republics into British property.  
In May 1910, the two republics with the British colonies became South Africa.  All 
governing power was maintained by whites.   
The African National Congress (ANC) was originally created in 1912 in 
opposition to white domination, and with a goal of ending government restrictions on 
blacks (Thema 1993, 88).  The ANC was unsuccessful in resisting the growing 
restrictions, and in 1948 the National Party (NP) won an all-white election and apartheid 
(meaning “apartness”) laws were enacted (Gascoigne 2001b).  These laws resulted in 
state sponsored racism.  Discrimination on the basis of race was institutionalized 
everywhere, extending to a prohibition on inter-racial marriages, and exclusion from 
specific jobs and restrictions on where a person of color could travel.  In 1950, a 
classification system was enacted that labeled South Africans as either white, black, or 
colored (anything which was not clearly white or black).  These classifications appeared 
on identity cards and passes, which South Africans were required to carry for travel 
outside of restricted areas.  The passes determined if one was allowed into a white area. 
This division was furthered in 1951 with the Bantu Authorities Act which created 
“homelands” (South Africa, U.S. State Department).  Many black South Africans were 
restricted to living in homelands which supposedly (but often incorrectly) corresponded 
to their ethnicity.  In this way, they were completely disenfranchised from South Africa.  
By 1981, four of these homelands were created as independent from South Africa.  The 
residents could not legally leave the homelands as they were no longer considered 
citizens of South Africa.  The 1953 Public Safety Act and Criminal Law Amendment Act 
prohibited any anti-apartheid protests while at the same time increasing the government’s 
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capability to instill consequences.  A state of emergency was declared in 1960 in 
response to protests of the ANC and the Pan-African Congress (PAC), which included 
mass violence on the part of the government, resulting in 69 dead, 180 injured, and the 
arrest of, among others, Nelson Mandela (South Africa, U.S. State Department).  This 
state of emergency was issued again and again until 1989 and led to grave human rights 
violations.  During this time a person could be detained by a police officer for 6 months 
without a hearing.  Thousands died while in detention, frequently as a result of torture.   
Finally, in 1986, in response to mass national as well as international opposition 
to apartheid, the South African government engaged Mandela in discussion.  In 1990 the 
official ban on the ANC, PAC, and other anti-apartheid groups ended, and Mandela was 
released from prison.  1991 marked the elimination of the last laws which promoted 
apartheid.  In December of 1993 a new constitution was created, and on May 10, 1994 
Nelson Mandela became president in South Africa’s first non apartheid election.  The 
South African Parliament established a mandate for the South African Commission of 
Truth and Reconciliation in December of 1995, which would release its final report 
publicly in 2003 (ICTJ, South Africa). 
 
History: Sierra Leone Conflict 
The history of conflict in Sierra Leone is a long one that extends back to the 
colonial period.  Between the years of 1787 to 1794, the British assisted in transporting 
over 1000 freed slaves from London, the United States, and Nova Scotia, to what was to 
be called Freetown on the most western point of Sierra Leone (Sierra Leone, U.S. State 
Department).  This evolved into a successful British colony with the help of the Krio 
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(returned slaves who had become somewhat assimilated into a European way of life).  
The Krio originally came from all over Africa, but now shared English as a common 
language, and Christianity as a common cultural point of reference.  Needless to say the 
return of the Krio generated conflict with the indigenous people of Sierra Leone 
(Gascoigne 2001).  From 1896 to 1951, Britain maintained a protectorate over Sierra 
Leone without the consent of the indigenous inhabitants.  The Sierra Leone TRC findings 
state: 
“The Commission finds that the Colonial power in Sierra Leone deliberately 
created two nations in the same land, one in the colony and the other in the protectorate. 
The impact of the separate development policies had far-reaching consequences, 
particularly in the fields of education, access to resources and in the social and political 
development of the two regions. The policies of the Colonial government led to the 
preferential development of the Colony at the expense of the Protectorate” (Sierra Leone 
TRC: Findings 2004, 6). 
Although the differentiation between native groups did lead to conflict within the 
country, ultimately Sierra Leone independence was achieved without violence.  In 1951, 
decolonization was worked into the constitution and by 1961 Sierra Leone became part of 
the British commonwealth (Sierra Leone, U.S. State Department).  In 1967, however, the 
new democracy of Sierra Leone started its decline.  The All Peoples Congress (APC) led 
by Siaka Stevens won plurality in parliament and began a series of efforts to ensure that 
he and his party had sole power through a repressive rule.  Stevens went so far as to 
amend the constitution so it would only acknowledge one party, the APC (Sierra Leone, 
U.S. State Department).  The government failed to recognize any opposition, thereby 
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eliminating the possibility of democratic competition.  Corruption increased in 1985, 
when Maj. Gen. Joseph Saidu Momoh was elected president after Stevens retired.  
According to the Sierra Leone TRC findings: “By the end of the 1980s, Sierra Leone had 
become a deeply fragmented country, marked by an almost total lack of national identity. 
Notions of citizenship and patriotism had become meaningless concepts” (2004, 7).  This 
fragmentation and lack of government accountability established the backdrop for the 
next ten years of civil war. 
 In 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) began attacks on the south-eastern 
border of Sierra Leone to gain control of diamond mines in the region, while pushing the 
Sierra Leone army back towards Freetown.  In 1992, Capt Valentine Strasser initiated a 
military coup which resulted in the exile of Momoh to Guinea; Strasser then established 
the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) as ruling party of Sierra Leone.  By 
1995, the RUF had gained considerable ground, controlling most of the western portion 
of Sierra Leone and moving in on Freetown.  The NPRC hired mercenaries to drive back 
these forces in 1995 and by the following year turned over power to a civilian 
government, at which point Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a UN diplomat, won the presidency 
(Sierra Leone, U.S. State Department).  However, by 1997 Kabbah was thrown out of 
office by a violent military coup, at which point, the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC), led by Johnny Koroma, wrested control and invited members of the 
RUF into the government.  This was followed by wide scale human rights violations in 
which RUF leader Foday Sankoh joined Koroma’s military government, and together 
their supporters ravaged the country (Gascoigne 2001).  Sankoh was able to take 
advantage of the collapsed economic structure and recruit young people for the military 
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(specifically child soldiers).  Additionally, the diamond mining industry was able to 
provide roughly $300 million of revenue each year for the rebel forces.  As a result of the 
failed government and economic system more than 40 percent of the country’s population 
was dislocated, with many seeking asylum in surrounding countries (Pratt 1999, Report 
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs). 
The United Nations (UN) opposed Sankoh’s coup and instated sanctions on 
military material imports while also prohibiting international travel by members of the 
military.  Dozens were killed during this time of AFRC and RUF conflict.  In March 
1998, the Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) overthrew AFRC and reinstated President Kabbah.  This movement 
instigated much violence in Freetown, which led to what became known as “Operation 
No Living Thing”.  The “operation” consisted of murders, torture, and intentional 
dismemberment of the civilian population.  Rebel forces used women and children as 
shields during their attacks, burned entire cities, and abducted 3,000 children (Pratt 
1999).  Finally the violence on all sides subsided enough for President Kabbah and RUF 
leader Sankoh to sign the Lomé Peace Agreement on July 7th 1999, which among other 
provisions, established a shared government between Kabbah and Sankoh.  This would 
not, however, be the end of the violence.  In 2000 RUF rebels took members of the 
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) hostage and killed anti-RUF 
demonstrators.  Sankoh and various members of RUF were arrested and removed from 
government positions.  In November 2000, a new peace agreement signed in Abuja in a 
renewed effort for disarmament, but it was hindered by an attack on the RUF by Guinean 
forces in response to RUF attacks in Guinea.  Peace efforts were made for a third time in 
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May of 2001, in which a second Abuja Agreement for peace was signed between the 
government and rebel forces.  It ultimately led to large scale disarmament and 
demobilization of the rebels.  On January 18th 2002, the ten year civil war was officially 
declared over.  By May of that year, President Kabbah was re-elected in a democratic 
election with 70% of the vote.  The RUF failed to hold a single seat.  In the summer of 
2002 the Sierra Leone TRC was established by the president and parliament (as per the 
Lomé Peace Agreement), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SPSL) was instated by 
the United Nations (USIP, Sierra Leone).  In October 2004, the TRC publicly released its 
final report.  
 
Data Analysis: 
 
South Africa 
 In this section I will conceptually disaggregate “reconciliation” into a series of 
subcomponents, and will rank the level of achievement of each sub-component on a scale 
from 1 to 3 (i.e. 1= low quality, 2= medium, 3= high)1.  The following serves as a 
reminder of South Africa’s TRC mandate so that we may keep in mind its ultimate goals 
as we refer back to the operationalized definition of reconciliation.  The Promotion of 
National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 mandates the TRC “to provide for the 
investigation and the establishment of as complete a picture as possible of the nature, 
causes and extent of gross violations of human rights” (Republic of South Africa 1995, 
1).  To achieve its mandate the TRC was divided into three committees: the Human 
                                                 
1
 For an overview of all the sub-components of reconciliation, please refer back to Figure 2 (p.21).  For a 
discussion of scoring please see discussion on page 23.   
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Rights Violations Committee (HRVC), the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee 
(RRC), and the Amnesty Committee (AC).   
 
 
Truth: 
 
 Truth is one of the two primary components of reconciliation.  It is also a primary 
goal of the TRC, as stated in its mandate to collect a complete, all encompassing truth 
with contributions from all sides of the conflict.  Collecting an accurate version of the 
truth completely depends on the willingness of the people of South Africa to testify, and 
the strength of their testimonies.  However, it is important to look at the viewpoint of 
both the victims and perpetrators in regards to the commission. 
 
I) Victim and Perpetrator Testimony 
The Human Rights Violations Committee (HRVC) was mandated to hear 
testimonies from victims of human rights violations and corroborate them through an 
extensive database (Republic of South Africa 2003, vol. 1 [4] 148).  It was considered in 
the best interest of a victim to testify to the HRVC not only for the psychological 
benefits, but also so that their information could be transferred with recommendations to 
the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee (RRC).  Additionally, perpetrators named 
by victims could be summoned to the commission to testify themselves and either be sent 
to a prosecution mechanism, or appeal to the Amnesty Committee (AC).   
The TRC in general was a very emotionally-charged atmosphere.  Victims were 
connected to their stories and shared them in extensive detail, drawing out the emotions 
of the rest of the commission and audience.  In one instance, during a particularly graphic 
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and moving testimony from a mother who lost a son, Archbishop Tutu “put his own face 
down on the table in front of him and wept uncontrollably” (Allen 2006, 352).  
Commissioner Mary Burton stated in reference to public testimony, “the right to be heard 
and acknowledged, with respect and empathy, did contribute to a process of healing in 
many cases” (Graybill and Lanegran 2004, 6).   
Furthermore, there was a clear incentive for the perpetrators to testify for the 
commission.  They could voluntarily approach the AC or be subpoenaed to the 
commission if their name was tied to a crime by either a victim, witness, or other 
perpetrator (Graybill 2002, 69).  The AC was then mandated to determine whether the 
perpetrator had shared his or her complete story in as much detail as possible and whether 
his or her crimes were politically motivated.  If these conditions were met the perpetrator 
would be granted amnesty and begin the process of rehabilitation and reintegration into 
the community.  If they did not meet the requirements of the AC, perpetrators could be 
prosecuted for their crimes in a court external to the TRC (Republic of South Africa 
2003, vol. 1[5] 8).   
There were religious underpinnings to the commission which resonated culturally 
with many South Africans.  Tutu constantly linked religious concepts to the notion of 
Ubuntu and encouraged perpetrators to repent and victims to forgive.  He argued that the 
work of the TRC was not just about securing amnesty but instead was aimed at 
demonstrating cooperation and group solidarity to promote harmony.  A common theme 
emerged akin to Ubuntu: that “group interests should prevail over individual rights” and 
would ultimately lead to reconciliation for all.   Wilson has criticized this approach and 
the legitimacy of the “truth” gathered as a result of Ubuntu.  He states that the 
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“constitutional right of citizens to due justice, to pursue civil claims against perpetrators, 
is taken away by amnesty laws…this was justified in terms of a uniquely African form of 
compassion, or Ubuntu.  By combining human rights and Ubuntu, human rights come to 
express compromised justice” (Wilson 2001, 11).   
On account of the South African TRC in working directly with the prosecution 
mechanism, if a complete truth is not obtained by the AC, the restorative justice option 
yields to retributive justice, so a victim is not deprived of justice.  The victim’s and 
perpetrator’s perception of the TRC rests on the commission’s ability to gather 
testimonies and to engage both victims and perpetrators in order to obtain the full story.  
It was clear that both victims and perpetrators had a strong incentive to come to the 
commission and testify, and to share their experiences over the prior three decades of 
conflict.  My overall rating for the quality of victim and perpetrator testimony then is 
high, i.e. 3 on a scale ranging from 1 (low) to 3 (high).  [Score: 3]   
 
II) Scope and Comprehensiveness of Information 
One important aspect in determining whether the TRC achieved a high level of 
truth to contribute to reconciliation is whether or not the people of South Africa are 
satisfied with it.  Ultimately, the people have to accept that the truth gathered is complete 
and impartial in order for it to be effective.  Academic James L. Gibson, conducted 
extensive public opinion surveys on various aspects of South Africa’s TRC.  He included 
members of the four major racial groups in South Africa in the interview pool (African, 
White, Coloured, and Asian Origin), and provided surveys in numerous different 
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languages in order to make them accessible to all.  Ultimately he collected 3727 
completed interviews (Gibson and Macdonald 2001, 2). 
Participants were asked to rate their “satisfaction with specific aspects of the 
performance of the truth and reconciliation commission”.  The following table 
graphically represents Gibson’s findings. 
Table 1: 
Satisfaction with Specific Aspects of the Performance of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission 
  Excellent 
Job 
Pretty 
Good Job 
Pretty 
Bad Job Poor Job 
Don’t 
Know N 
Providing true and unbiased 
account of country’s history       
 African 46.2 38.9 5.3 2.1 7.6 2000 
 White 3.6 30.9 28.0 19.6 17.9 986 
 Coloured 13.6 34.5 9.5 4.8 37.6 484 
 Asian Origin 18.8 53.1 10.6 5.7 11.8 245 
  Percentages (Totaling to 100%)  
(Gibson and Macdonald 2001, 22) 
Gibson received a fairly positive response from the majority of those who took 
the survey, especially within the black South African group (i.e. the “African” in the table 
above) which comprises the vast majority of the population (78%).  The majority 
believed the TRC did either a “pretty good job” or “excellent job” gathering a “true and 
unbiased account of the country’s history” (Gibson and Macdonald 2001, 2). 
 A second significant contributing factor in the assessment of truth is the provision 
of conditional amnesty, and its ability to draw people into participating in the TRC.  The 
Commission received 21,000 statements from alleged victims and 7,124 from individuals 
pursuing amnesty (Republic of South Africa 2003, vol. 2 [1] 2).  Over “50 public 
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hearings were held, spanning a total of 244 days”, comprised of what the commission 
deemed representative cases (Hamber and Kibble 2007, 12).  Because of the sheer 
volume of statements, there was not sufficient time for all contributors to be heard.  All of 
these statements were processed and turned over to the RRC with recommendations.  
Cases that both demonstrated a variety of human rights violations and were representative 
of a generalized pattern of abuse (about 10% of the total) were chosen for public 
testimony (Hamber and Kibble 2007, 12).   
 Desmond Tutu, in the forward of the final report, stated that there was in fact 
public displeasure when a case in prosecution was dismissed because of reasonable 
doubt, which often resulted from a lack of witnesses.  By contrast, in the TRC he said 
“Amnesty applicants often confessed to more gruesome crimes… yet their assumption of 
responsibility, and the sense that at least people were getting some measure of truth from 
the process, resulted in much less anger” (Republic of South Africa 2003, vol. 1 [1] 1). 
The provision of conditional amnesty effectively drew out information and required 
people to take responsibility for their actions who otherwise may have attempted to 
maintain their innocence in a court setting.   
Additionally, the commission had the power to subpoena witnesses, and the right 
to search and seizure, which gave them the authority to investigate cases thoroughly.  
This was a novel concept for TRCs (Hamber and Kibble 2007, 14).  It ensured that the 
information gathered was in fact the truth, as it could be measured against other’s 
testimony.  As a result, the AC had the strength to extract meaningful testimonies from 
those who may have been reluctant to share. 
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Unfortunately, the TRC was underutilized by the white community.  Even if many 
of them simply benefited passively from apartheid, testifying to the commission as a 
witness could have provided a vehicle for expressing an apology and could have 
benefited the overall process of reconciliation. 
Ultimately, there was an extensive effort from the commission, victims, 
perpetrators, and witnesses in general to collaborate and piece together what is largely 
perceived to be an accurate picture of the conflict and resulting human rights violations.  
Thereby, my overall rating for the quality of the scope and comprehensiveness of 
information is medium-high.  [Score: 2.5] 
 
III) Access v. restriction to commission 
Because of the geographic size of South Africa and in the interest of facilitating 
easy access, the commission decided to decentralize.  It created its primary office in Cape 
Town with four regional offices in Cape Town, Johannesburg, Durban, and East London, 
and a sub regional office in Bloemfontein (Republic of South Africa 2003, vol. 1 [6] 6).  
The committee members and commissioners than made a proactive attempt to 
communicate with members of the surrounding communities.  Additionally, they held 
community hearings and information sessions in which they would travel to a particular 
community, which helped to lend context to testimonies given by victims, perpetrators 
and occasional experts (Republic of South Africa 2003, vol. 1 [6] 16b).  Nevertheless, the 
commission deemed the access to the commission insufficient and extended its efforts to 
ensure the rural populations were being equally represented.  The TRC assigned a 
“community liaison officer” to each region to coordinate efforts with local partner 
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organizations in order to train statement-takers who would have access to these 
communities and make sure their voices were heard.  “The project increased the number 
of statements taken by the Commission by almost 50 per cent” (Republic of South Africa 
2003, vol. 1 [6] 16c).   
The commission continually expanded its availability until they could ensure the 
TRC was accessible to all.  Hence, I rate access to the commission as being high.  
[Score: 3] 
 
IV) Publicity and awareness 
The TRC would have been of little use if the population of South Africa were 
unaware of its existence and purpose.  This is why the country embraced an educational 
campaign with a slogan of “revealing is healing” to demonstrate the ultimate goal: that 
truth leads to reconciliation.  The commission took initiatives to work with local media, 
NGOs, and think-tanks to distribute informational booklets to the public and present 
resources through television, radio, and newspapers (Republic of South Africa 2003, vol. 
1 [9] 31-32).  The state and the TRC also emphasized the concept of Ubuntu, in an effort 
to make a cultural connection with the people.  
According to Gibson’s study, the proportion of the population “expressing little or 
no awareness of the TRC activities” was as follows: 
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Table 2: 
“Percent Expressing Little or No Awareness of the TRC Activities 
 African 11% 
 White  12% 
 Colored 33% 
 Asian origin 9%    
 
(Gibson 2004, 92) 
It is clear that advertising campaigns were effective in educating the public, especially in 
the many rural areas of South Africa.  It is worth mentioning that there was a positive 
correlation between awareness of the TRC and confidence in the TRC, which also held 
true with the Colored South Africans (who had the least awareness of the TRC)—
meaning that as they became aware of the commission, they also tended to be more 
confident in its actions (Gibson 2004, 92). 
During the TRC, the South African Broadcast Company aired live coverage of the 
public hearings in addition to a weekly program which was shown every Sunday from 
April 1996 to March 1998 and provided a summary of the week’s events (Gibson 2006, 
416).  This program consistently had one of the highest popularity ratings on television; 
however, even more people became aware of the TRC’s activities through extensive 
radio exposure.  Additionally, the TRC’s decision to hold public hearings in rural 
communities further increased awareness and educated the people on their option to 
testify. 
The final report of the TRC and the process more generally assigned blame to all 
parties regardless of whether or not they were presently in a position of power.   
Additionally, all had an incentive to testify to the commission, which made itself widely 
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available.  My assessment of the quality of publicity and public awareness is thus high.  
[Score: 3] 
I calculate the average of all the sub-components of truth to be: 2.875; which 
signifies a high level of truth gathered. 
 
Restorative Justice: 
 Restorative justice is the second major sub-component of reconciliation.  The 
RRC and AC both contributed significantly to achieving restorative justice in South 
Africa.  The AC had the ability to actually investigate crimes and subpoena witnesses in 
order to bring justice to victims, and the RRC was mandated to develop recommendations 
to the government in terms of rehabilitation and reparations for victims.  The following is 
a discussion of the constitutive elements of restorative justice, each of which I rate for 
overall quality in the South Africa case. 
 
I) Rehabilitation 
a) Implementation of mechanism 
Guy Lamb of the Center for Conflict Resolution at the University of Cape Town 
researched the reintegration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants.  He found that 77% of 
respondents did not have the equivalent of a high school diploma, which greatly restricted 
their employment options especially--since 80% were less than 50 years of age and have 
been an asset to the work force (Lamb 2003, 1-2).  Many of the respondents depended on 
family members for basic necessities and support, and about a third said they suffered 
from psychological problems.  Lamb reported informal support structures existing among 
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social networks of ex-combatants, who discussed job opportunities and strategy as well 
as political progress; 83% of ex-combatants responded that they did belong to a 
community (2003, 3).  Though an internal support group and community acceptance are 
undoubtedly important to overall well-being, the inability of ex-combatants to be 
economically self-sufficient was draining for those they depended upon as well as for 
their communities.  “Many former combatants have been unsuccessful in effectively 
reintegrating into civilian society and consequently further targeted support for these 
individuals is required” (Lamb 2003, 4).  This does not necessarily involve government 
providing certain amenities to ex-combatants, but giving them the skills to acquire 
necessities themselves. 
In terms of victims, there is a very slow process toward obtaining physical and 
mental health assistance although it was recommended by the TRC.  “There has been 
some movement in recent years towards providing services and benefits through the 
programs of various government departments.  However to date these have been ill-
coordinated and without a monitoring function in place it is impossible to assess actual 
impact” (University of Witwatersrand 2010, Traces of Truth). 
South Africa does need formalized rehabilitation programs specific to adult 
victims of apartheid.  The country does make a visible effort to make these amenities 
available to children; there are specific programs aimed at demobilization, reinsertion and 
reintegration of child soldiers, for example, one of which is funded by the World Bank.  
Additional resources are contributed by UN agencies such as United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF).  It appears the process of the TRC has helped to reintegrate some ex-
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combatants, but more targeted assistance would be beneficial.  My overall rating for 
quality of the implementation mechanisms for rehabilitation is thus low. [Score: 1.5] 
 
II) Guarantee of non repetition 
a) Memorial efforts 
The final report of South Africa’s TRC refers to memorials as a form of “public 
official acknowledgement”.  The commission viewed a memorial as a form of symbolic 
reparations, which “are also wider in scope or more holistic than those customarily 
awarded as damages in successful civil claims” (Republic of South Africa 2003, vol. 1 
[5] 95).  In this way, the reparations are more lasting and will have intergenerational 
implications.  There were ceremonial aspects to the TRC which served to memorialize 
those who were lost over the preceding decades of conflict.  They typically involved 
prayer and other religious acts which many in attendance could internalize, in addition to 
the lighting of a memorial candle, and the singing of hymns and songs at each hearing 
(Republic of South Africa 2003, vol. 5 [1] 10). 
There are also numerous government-initiated permanent memorials in the 
process of being created, some of which include the Women’s Monument to recognize 
the involvement and active effort of women against apartheid.  The Nelson Mandela 
Museum opened in 2000 and is comprised of a museum, a youth center, and a visitor’s 
center.  In 1998 the Ncome Monument and Wall of Remembrance were established with 
a museum opening the following year, to honor Zulu involvement.  Additionally, the 
government took the TRC recommendation to pursue a Freedom Park.  This project is 
expected to be completed in 2010 and honors the anti-apartheid movement and those who 
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fought for freedom and equality in South Africa.  The park was “hailed by President 
Thabo Mbeki as ‘…the fulcrum of our vision to heal and reconcile our nation…’” and 
will reshape the skyline of the capital city Pretoria (Lomholt and Welch 2008). 
There is also a War Graves Project in progress which aims to “archive 
photographs of every single South African and Rhodesian war grave from the second 
Anglo-Boer War, Bambatha Rebellion, WW1, Rand Revolt, WW2, Korea, Freedom 
Struggle, Angola-Border War, Non World War and Police to present day” (War Graves 
Project 2010).  These photos will eventually contribute to a physical memorial as well as 
one online, so that those who cannot travel to the grave sites of their loved ones may still 
feel connected, and receive closure (McLean 2010). 
These are but a few of the memorials, monuments, and government facilities 
created to honor those who were lost during the past decades of violence, as well as to 
acknowledge the violations of the past and to serve as a guarantee of non repetition. My 
overall assessment of the quality of war memorials is thus high.  [Score: 3]   
 
b) Government accountability for reform 
 Public opinion surveys are one method researchers can employ to assess whether 
the government is taking adequate precautions to ensure past human rights violations are 
not repeated and that the reform promised is achieved.  Gibson’s survey included 
questions on respondents’ perceptions of government success in “ensuring that human 
rights abuses won’t happen again” (2001, 22).  The results are described below: 
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Table 3: 
  Excellent 
Job 
Pretty 
Good Job 
Pretty 
Bad Job Poor Job 
Don’t 
Know N 
 
Ensuring that human rights 
abuses won’t happen again       
 African 48.6 36.4 4.5 1.9 8.7 1999 
 White 6.2 32.1 21.7 18.0 22.1 983 
 Coloured 18.3 28.2 6.8 8.0 38.7 486 
 Asian Origin 18.9 46.7 11.1 7.0 16.4 244 
  Percentages (Totaling to 100 %) 
(Gibson and Macdonald 2001, 22) 
 Gibson received mixed reviews here, depending upon the ethnicity of the 
respondent, though across the board the majority of responses fell into the “Pretty 
Good/Excellent Job” category (2001, 22).  With coloured people responding “Don’t 
Know” in relatively high numbers (38.7) (Gibson and Macdonald 2001, 22). 
 A first step in fostering government accountability is the decision to provide 
conditional amnesty for all parties.  No group was exempt from being subpoenaed to the 
TRC to serve as a witness.  Once subpoenaed, an individual could apply for amnesty or 
risk being sent to a prosecution mechanism if he or she was tied to a politically motivated 
crime.  
 The running of a fair, democratic election is also a demonstration of government 
commitment to reform, and 1994 marked the first, universal adult suffrage, post apartheid 
election.  Nelson Mandela achieved an easy victory with an overwhelming 62% of the 
general vote.  Frederik Willem deKlerk who was the incumbent, spoke in reference to the 
election, characterizing it as “the realization of the vision I spelled out in Parliament on 2 
February 1990” (de Klerk 1999, 334).  DeKlerk expressed that he simply wanted to attain 
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a one-third vote because of the system of proportional representation in South Africa, but 
was not disappointed with his 20% (1999, 334).  He said it was “a critical moment for 
many ANC supporters.  Quite a number of them never fully believed that we would really 
hand over power when the moment arrived” (de Klerk 1999, 334).  The ability for South 
Africa to successfully hold democratic elections and honor the results reflected a high 
level of government accountability.  [Score: 2.5] 
  i) State apology 
While exploring South African perception of government accountability, Gibson 
asked his respondents if they supported “government compensation in the form of public 
apologies to the victims” (Gibson and Macdonald 2001, 28).  The responses were 
overwhelmingly positive, as indicated below: 
Table 4:  
 
The Role of the Government in Compensating Victims 
 
Government Compensation in 
the form of.... 
Support 
Doing Do Not Support Don’t Know N 
 
Public Apologies to the 
Victims     
 African 86.2 11.5 2.3 2004 
 White 73.9 19.6 6.5 988 
 Coloured 66.5 13.0 20.6 486 
 Asian Origin 90.6 8.2 1.2 245 
  Percentages (Totaling to 100 %) 
(Gibson and Macdonald 2001, 28) 
 
On August 21, 1996, during his testimony to the TRC, the apartheid-era president 
of South Africa and leader of the National Party (NP), Frederik Willem de Klerk, made a 
formal apology for the actions resulting in “pain and suffering caused by former policies 
of the National Party” (National Endowment for Democracy 1996, 185).  He 
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acknowledged that a “prime purpose of the truth and reconciliation process is to learn 
from the experiences of the past and to ensure that we never again repeat the same 
mistakes” (National Endowment for Democracy 1996, 185).  He specified that no group 
could solely be blamed for the decades of human rights abuses, nor could any individual 
escape guilt whether he or she was actively involved or passively benefited.  Likewise, no 
group could take full credit for ending apartheid and bringing the country to peace.  
Overall, deKlerk emphasized that it is important to recognize the process of 
reconciliation as a group process such that there is no way for a country to move forward 
if people do not take responsibility for the past and get involved in bettering the future. 
Thabo Mbeki, leader of the ANC and the post-apartheid president of South Africa 
(1999-2008) offered a public apology which very much paralleled that of de Klerk.  He 
stated that “the ANC highly regrets the excesses that occurred” during the battle against 
apartheid (National Endowment for Democracy 1996, 186).  He then acknowledged the 
work of the TRC and stated, “we appreciate the fact that the Commission is pursuing its 
work without fear or favor” (National Endowment for Democracy 1996, 187).   
It is significant that both the last apartheid-era president and a post-apartheid 
president, apologized on behalf of their respective organizations.  Both showed respect 
for and encouraged participation in the TRC.  This sets an example for the rest of the 
country to follow.  Hence I rate the quality of public apology as high.  [Score: 3] 
Averaging all sub-components of the category, I assign an overall score for the 
guarantee of non-repetition a 2.83.  
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III) Restitution 
 
In the South African TRC, restitution was managed through the RRC.  While the 
AC had active powers and legal rights, the RRC could only listen to testimony and go 
through statements passed over by the HRVC in order to make recommendations to the 
government.  The government, in turn, was free to take or disregard such 
recommendations.  However, as a result of the conditional amnesty provision there was 
the added aspect: if a perpetrator did not testify adequately under the guidelines of the 
AC, she or he could be sent to a prosecution mechanism.  Though South Africa’s TRC 
focused on Ubuntu, encompassing peace and forgiveness as a community, the possibility 
of prosecution for those who did not conform offered an additional form of restitution to 
a victim. 
 
a) Compensation 
 
i) Monetary/Benefits 
 
The RRC did not have any power to actually offer reparations but only to make 
recommendations to the government.  There was a “President’s Fund” which was 
comprised of contributions from parliament and private donations which could be used to 
fund reparations (Republic of South Africa 2003, vol. 1 [5] 93). 
One especially complicated aspect of compensation dealt with the 1994 Land 
reform program, which sought to “restore land to individuals and communities who can 
prove they were dispossessed by apartheid policy and practices since the 1913 Land Act” 
(Andrew 2006, 1).  Obviously, restoration of land was impeded by the private owners 
who had already settled on the land.  There are many symbolic methods of compensation 
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but they mean little when a person believes he or she is rightfully entitled to a piece of 
land which was unfairly taken away.  When it is unfeasible to give the land back to its 
original owners, it then becomes an issue of negotiating value in order to move forward 
with monetary restitution.  In the South African case, negotiations over land value 
resulted in a long, drawn-out process with few conclusions.  Andrew has argued that 
“This political framework does not offer a democratic solution to the socially embedded 
land question. It seems abundantly clear that restitution cannot ‘close this painful chapter 
of history’” (2006, 14). 
Gibson’s survey included questions on public perceptions of government 
compensation.  The responses are summarized as follows: 
Table 5: 
Satisfaction with Specific Aspects of the Performance of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission 
  Excellent 
Job 
Pretty 
Good Job 
Pretty 
Bad Job Poor Job 
Don’t 
Know N 
Awarding compensation to 
victims       
 African 43.0 30.5 9.5 7.2 9.8 2002 
 White 4.5 25.4 26.3 15.9 27.9 984 
 Coloured 10.9 22.8 11.1 11.5 43.6 486 
 Asian Origin 15.9 40.8 13.9 14.3 15.1 245 
  Percentages (Totaling to 100 %) 
(Gibson and Macdonald 2001, 21) 
 Responses vary by ethnicity, without a general consensus across the board: 
although the largest response group “African” did have overwhelmingly positive 
feedback, whites were far less convinced of the TRC’s success and coloured people 
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overwhelmingly responded they “Don’t Know” how to rate the TRC’s success (Gibson 
and Macdonald 2001, 21). 
In 2003, President Mbeki announced that 22,000 victims of apartheid who 
testified to the TRC would receive 30,000 rand (about US $3,800) worth of reparations 
(Peta 2003).  This was a severe disappointment to the victims.  Even though it was 
presented as a symbolic move by the government, it was insufficient in providing real 
economic assistance to those who had suffered so much.  Since 2003, the South African 
government has moved away from money as compensation to an emphasis on community 
restitution and symbolic reparation (Sacco and Hoffman 2004, 9).  As I have argued 
previously, a monetary award can never truly provide compensation for the human rights 
violations that have occurred but instead serves as a symbolic apology that contributes to 
the guarantee of non repetition.  Public opinion data reveals that the people of South 
Africa for the most part have accepted these modest sums as satisfactory compensation 
from the government. In this way the South African government has acknowledged the 
injustices, sought out the victims, and taken steps toward compensation.  Yet regardless 
of the symbolic importance of reparations, many continue to call attention to “the vast 
inequality between rich and poor, which still is mostly determined by race” (Graybill 
2002, 357).  My assessment of the overall quality of the monetary component of the 
TRC’s work is mixed.  [Score: 2] 
ii) Community Service 
 
There were individual instances of perpetrators taking it upon themselves to pay 
some sort of restitution for their wrongdoings.  For example, Eugene de Kock, formerly 
of the South African Police, donated the royalties from his autobiography to a trust fund 
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established for apartheid victims.  Another perpetrator helped clear land mines and 
counted it as a symbolic penance, while yet another considered risking his life to turn 
crucial information over to the commission as his form of restitution (Hamber and Kibble 
2007, 21-22).  However, these instances are not representative of the lager population.  
The National Institute for Crime Prevention and Reintegration of Offenders (Nicro) 
works with youth to promote restorative justice and reintegration through community 
service, education, and therapy programs.  Yet Graybill states that even the 
commissioners represented in her article, Alex Boraine and Mary Burton, “are critical of 
the government's limited response to the Commission's recommendations for substantial 
reparations” (Graybill 2002, 357).  Monetary reparations cannot hope to compensate for 
what a person has lost as a result of human rights violations, although restorative justice 
(such as in the form of community service) carries significant symbolic weight.  South 
Africa seems to lack organized community service programs open to adults, despite the 
fact that such programs could be extremely beneficial for perpetrators as well as victims. 
Overall South Africa’s TRC does not provide a formal opportunity for community 
service resulting in a low score.  [Score: 1] 
 Given the mixed record of South Africa’s TRC in the various sub-components of 
restitution, the average score is 1.5.  
 The overall score I assign for Restorative Justice as a composite of rehabilitation,  
the guarantee of non-repetition is 1.94 (i.e. a medium level of restorative justice). 
 Therefore, the overall Reconciliation score resulting from the average of truth and 
restorative justice, is 2.41 which signifies a medium-high level of reconciliation 
ultimately achieved in South Africa.  (Truth-2.875, Restorative Justice- 1.94) 
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Sierra Leone 
 
 Below, I reiterate the mandate of the Sierra Leone TRC as laid out in the Lomé 
Peace Agreement.  It is important to keep the ultimate goals of the commission in the 
forefront as I assess the TRC’s overall success in achieving reconciliation.  The Sierra 
Leonean TRC mandate states: 
“The object for which the Commission is established is to create an 
impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and 
international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra 
Leone, from the beginning of the Conflict in 1991 to the signing of the 
Lomé Peace Agreement; to address impunity, to respond to the needs of 
the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a 
repetition of the violations and abuses suffered” (part 3 (6) 1). 
 
 
Truth: 
 Developing a comprehensive historical record depends upon having valid, 
comprehensive contributions from the victims, witnesses, and perpetrators.  Before I 
assess the scope and comprehensiveness of the information gathered, it is important to be 
aware of the mindset of the victims and perpetrators in Sierra Leone with regard to the 
commission.   
I) Victim and Perpetrator Testimony 
It is widely accepted that the perpetrators feared the TRC primarily because of its 
proximity to the Special Court for Sierra Leone2.  Perpetrators did not trust that the TRC 
would not reveal information to the Special Court which would have led to their 
subsequent prosecution.  Their doubts were reinforced by the fact that the Commission 
and the Court sat practically adjacent to each other in Freetown and the officials were 
                                                 
2
  The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established by the Government of Sierra Leone and the United 
Nations and is mandated to try “those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 
November 1996” (The Special Court for Sierra Leone 2010, about).   
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frequently seen together.  There was actually a rumor that there was an underground 
tunnel connecting the two (Kelsall 2005, 381).  Rosalind Shaw, who wrote a special 
report on the Sierra Leone TRC for the United States Institute of Peace, reported: “In 
every district in which I conducted research during the TRC hearings in 2003 (Port Loko, 
Bombali, Kambia, Tonkolili, and Moyamba), ex-combatants were almost universally 
fearful of the TRC” (2005, 4).  This fear was so pronounced that perpetrators actually 
attempted to run out the statement takers upon their arrival, or went into hiding 
themselves.  Shaw states, “Ex-combatant’s participation was low in all of the district 
hearings I attended, and one of the district hearings (Port Loko) was unable to obtain any 
ex-combatant testimonies at all” (2005, 4).  By virtue of the government providing 
blanket amnesty, ex-combatants made a personal choice as to whether or not they wanted 
to testify.  Various factors influenced their decision to do so or not:  a discomfort with the 
situation, distrust of the commission, dismissal of accountability, or general disinclination 
to testify. 
 Victims were hesitant to embrace the commission and opted instead for a “forgive 
and forget” mentality for two reasons.  First, putting the past behind them fell within the 
norms of their culture better than healing through recanting violations.  “People had been 
talking about the violence when the violence was present, but once it stopped, healing 
took place through practices of social forgetting” (Shaw 2005, 9).  Victims and Sierra 
Leonean society more generally did not embrace the philosophy that talking about the 
events of the last ten years and revealing a truth would ultimately lead to healing.  Many 
who did testify seemed to do so in an unemotional state.  During Kelsall’s field research, 
he found the testimonies lacked detail, vividness, and an emotional connection (2005, 
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369).  One statement taker to whom he expressed these concerns stated: “They find it 
hard to say everything about those things, so they are just circling around the truth” 
(Kelsall 2005, 369).  Secondly, victims and witnesses feared retaliation by perpetrators, 
since many perpetrators served in the government or the new Sierra Leonean army due to 
the provision of blanket amnesty (Shaw 2005, 5).  It became apparent when perpetrators 
did testify that the audience looked to them to demonstrate a “cool heart” (Shaw 2005, 
11).  This characteristic of the perpetrator conveyed a transformation and goal to move 
forward peacefully.  It seemed the public was more concerned with ensuring that the ex-
combatants in their communities did not seek retaliation than with creating the basis for 
actual accountability.  Hence, the victim’s and perpetrator’s perceptions of the 
commission were not conducive to gathering a meaningful truth. Thus, my overall score 
for truth is low.  [Score: 1] 
 
II) Scope and Comprehensiveness of Information 
The victim’s and perpetrator’s perceptions of the TRC had a direct influence on 
the scope and comprehensiveness of information the commission was able to gather.  
What the commission introduced as verbal remembering (i.e. truth-telling with the intent 
of promoting healing and reconciliation) was not unanimously accepted among the Sierra 
Leonean population.  Drawing on the findings of her ethnographic study, Shaw states, 
“People in the northern Sierra Leonean communities in which I conducted research 
discussed the war within their families and inside their houses, but often reminded each 
other not to ‘pull it outside’” (2005, 9).  It is crucial when approaching such a sensitive 
subject as human rights violations, to align as much as possible and build upon the 
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philosophy of the local communities (Shaw 2005, 12).  In South Africa, for instance, 
there was a strong emphasis placed on exposing the truth and forgiving, which paralleled 
local religious beliefs.  In Sierra Leone, it was not so simple, and local beliefs were 
arguably not sufficiently integrated into the TRC.  In northern Sierra Leone, for example, 
some communities embraced the idea of “social forgetting”, choosing not to talk about 
the violence at all for fear it would lead to further aggression (Shaw 2005, 2).  Some 
areas went so far as to collectively agree not to testify before the commission.   
 As a result of centuries of reoccurring conflict in Sierra Leone, extending far 
beyond the ten year civil war, communities developed their own approaches to 
reconciliation in order to reintegrate perpetrators and move forward.  Some communities 
which had a history of self-initiated reconciliation gave priority to these efforts over those 
which were state initiated and unfamiliar.  In some cases, the TRC actively disrupted  
traditional practices of reconciliation at the community level, acting as an obstacle with 
potentially harmful consequences (Shaw 2005, 8-9). 
 Of the perpetrators who did testify, according to Kelsall’s observations, many did 
not take responsibility for their actions, often denying any participation (2005, 372).  
They apologized to the community, once pressured by the commissioners, for associating 
with groups which were responsible for human rights violations; but this apology meant 
little when none took individual responsibility.  In one interaction between a perpetrator 
and Bishop Kamara, the witness stated: “I am asking the people of this community to 
forgive me for whatever atrocities I have done.  Because we are RUF and we in the RUF 
did a lot of atrocities in this country” (Kelsall 2005, 373). 
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 Frustrated upon interviewing a perpetrator known to have committed violations to 
which he would not admit, one commissioner stated that the community knew of these 
atrocities and that “if you do not come out to publicly declare what you have done and 
ask for forgiveness for what you have done, you are not likely to get forgiveness” 
(Kelsall 2005, 373).  As a result of the blanket amnesty provision this is essentially the 
worst the commission could threaten: that a perpetrator would not receive forgiveness.  
Hence, there was little concrete incentive for perpetrators to publicly unveil all of their 
wrongdoings.   
 Although it was forbidden by the TRC for the audience to show disapproval with 
a testimony, the negative reactions to the perpetrators were evident.  A district 
representative of the People’s Party stated to Kelsall, “We are not happy!  They have not 
told the truth.  They are lying!” (2005, 377).  Other members of the community 
threatened to drive them out if they did not admit guilt and give an honest apology.  By 
the end of the testimonies, it seemed too many observers unlikely that a lasting 
reconciliation could be achieved (Kelsall 2005, 377). 
The mandate of the TRC included collecting an unbiased, complete truth, and 
addressing impunity in order to advance a peaceful reconciliation process.  I would argue 
that the decision of certain groups around the country (particularly a geographic area such 
as northern Sierra Leone) not to testify, or at least not revealing the complete truth, 
resulted is an incomplete truth as all groups were not involved.  This incomplete 
historical record came at the expense of addressing impunity which in turn undercut the 
process toward reconciliation.  The limited truth gathered from victims and witnesses in 
conjunction with a lack of individual responsibility on the part of the perpetrators who 
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did testify, resulted in a low level of scope and comprehensiveness of information. 
[Score: 1] 
 
III) Access v. restriction to commission 
 The TRC was in Freetown for two weeks and thereafter traveled to twelve 
different locations around Sierra Leone.  In an effort to make the commission accessible 
it was willing to transport witnesses to the venue so that transportation would not be an 
obstacle.  Bishop Humper stated to one witness early on, “Tell your brothers and sisters 
not to be afraid to come and testify because even in the provinces transportation will be 
made available for witnesses” (Sierra Leone TRC Ap. 3, 38).  There were 7,706 
statements taken, though not all who were interviewed participated in hearings or gave 
testimony out of either personal choice, or in the interest of time.  The commission 
attempted to hear testimony from a representative portion of the population and to 
publicize a wide variety of crimes (Sierra Leone TRC Ap. 1, 33).  There was some 
frustration by those who would have liked to, but were not given the opportunity to 
publicly testify.  Their truth was still gathered, just not in a public hearing as those were 
reserved for the worst crimes, and those which covered a representative spectrum of 
crimes.  This did limit the number of people actually able to talk about their experiences 
in public, but all of the testimonies were still gathered, and the choice to proceed in this 
way was made by the TRC in an effort to tell a complete story.  As a result I rate the 
access to the commission as high.  [Score: 3] 
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IV) Publicity and awareness 
Prior to the start of the TRC, workshops in Freetown and provincial towns 
employed “sensitization material” in order to raise awareness of the coming commission, 
its purpose and goals (Shaw 2005, 8).  Advertising consisted of print and images to 
increase understanding.  “Leaflets included drawings of burning villages, followed by 
drawings of ex-combatants testifying in front of stern civilians” with sayings meant to 
promote the TRC to the public.  Sayings included “Truth hurts, but war hurts more” and 
“Truth today!  Peaceful Sierra Leone Tomorrow” which advocated for the power of truth 
over social forgetting (Shaw 2005, 8). 
Publicity was comprised of radio, television, and print media (Sierra Leone TRC 
Ap.3, 147).  During the commission there was a 45 minute summary of the day’s events 
on television each night.  Sesay’s study asked respondents “whether they were aware of 
the existence of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission set up at the end of the civil 
war” (2007, 34)  The respondents consisted of elites, public, traditional leaders, and 
religious leaders. In total, 93.8% responded “yes” they were aware of the commission, 
with the remaining 6.2% responding “no” (Sesay 2007, 34).  It is important to note 
however, that the study was focused around Freetown which also received a 
disproportionate amount of the TRC publicity.  “The TRC would have been differently 
received had it not been more explicitly framed as a process that would enable people to 
put the past behind them” (Shaw 2005, 12).  The inability of the commission to develop a 
philosophy that would resonate with the community was detrimental to the revelation of 
truth.  However, the TRC’s message did reach most of the people of Sierra Leone, 
particularly those closer to Freetown.  Though publicity could have extended further and 
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been more personalized to the people of Sierra Leone, it is true that almost everyone was, 
at minimum, aware of the commission.  Thus, my overall rating for publicity and 
awareness of the commission is moderate.  [Score: 2] 
I calculated the average of the sub-components of truth to be 1.75 which signifies 
a medium/ medium-low level of truth gathered. 
 
Restorative Justice: 
The Lomé Peace Agreement promised “appropriations for public education, 
public health, infrastructural development, and compensation for incapacitated war 
victims as well as post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction” (Government of the 
Republic of Sierra Leone, and Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone 1999, (7) 6).  
The following are a series of related factors. 
 
I) Rehabilitation 
a) Implementation of mechanism 
 At the time the statements of victims were taken by the commission, 67% “had 
not received medical attention or counseling following the abuses” (Final Report Ap. 3, 
38).   In the following years there were other rehabilitation projects built for both victims 
and ex-combatants that were created with the help of NGO’s and intergovernmental 
organizations.  Some of these include mechanisms especially focused on the 
rehabilitation and reintegration of child-soldiers into their communities.  For instance the 
Child Advocacy and Rehabilitation (CAR) program run by the Sierra Leone Red Cross 
Society (SLRCS) has a number of centers around Sierra Leone.  The program focuses on 
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educating the children, teaching them life and occupational skills and giving them a 
community which offers support.  Roughly 2,400 children had enrolled by 2005 (Clifford 
2006, 1).  The SLRC also seeks to inform communities about the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) as well as to offer educational support services such as 
information on how to obtain employment, agricultural strategies, and sanitation (Clifford 
2006, 3).  The Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation Project was started during 
the peace process at the end of the war.  “The project sought to contribute to social 
stability and facilitate the return of displaced and refugee populations by investing at the 
earliest possible moment in the rehabilitation of destroyed villages” (Sierra Leone: 
Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation Project (P040649) 2003, 1).  The project 
boasts returning 220,000 displaced people to their communities of choice, and 
implementing 269 projects in “agriculture, community infrastructure, education, health, 
micro-enterprise promotion and reintegration and others” (Sierra Leone: Community 
Reintegration and Rehabilitation Project (P040649) 2003, 1). Among many other 
contributions, this project helped 84 schools and 28 health centers return to operation 
(Sierra Leone: Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation Project (P040649) 2003, 1).  
Contributors included the International Development Association (IDA), the African 
Development Bank, and the Sierra Leonean government.   
The Rehabilitation of Basic Education program, for which the Sierra Leonean 
government borrowed money from the World Bank for a project from 2003 to 2009, was 
aimed at preventing conflict and rebuilding the education system (Sierra Leone: 
Rehabilitation of Basic Education 2003).  This was a primary concern of the people who 
testified in the TRC. 
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 There does appear to be a concerted effort on the part of the government to offer 
rehabilitation mechanisms to the people of Sierra Leone.  For the most part, the projects 
are based on offering support and teaching so that the people can be more self sufficient.  
There is a joint international effort to provide sufficient resources and therapy to the 
people of Sierra Leone.  Overall I assess the implementation of rehabilitation 
mechanisms in Sierra Leone to be high.  [Score: 3] 
 
II) Guarantee of non repetition 
a) Memorial efforts 
The Sierra Leone TRC’s final report states that: “Insofar as memorials bring 
people together, such public spaces may promote reconciliation between enemies” (Sierra 
Leone TRC Ap. 4, 5).  Memorials spark a dialogue about the issues of the past and tie 
them to the present.  They serve as a constant reminder of the violations of the past, so 
that they may be guarded against going forward.  Memorials also offer symbolic 
reparations to the victims by not discounting their suffering. 
The discussions about creating a memorial included ideas from people on all sides 
of the conflict. The desire and effort to make the memorial accessible to everyone marked  
a very forward-looking moment of unification; giving the people of Sierra Leone a 
common goal.  Considerable research went into the creation of memorials in Sierra 
Leone.  The people of Sierra Leone expressed an interest in memorials built around the 
concept of hope and not forever focusing on a negative time in history (Sierra Leone 
TRC Ap. 4, 7).  The commission cites a traditional practice in Sierra Leone to bury the 
dead outside of the town and simply bring back a stone from the burial site to keep in 
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their home to show that the lost loved one will not be forgotten (Sierra Leone TRC Ap. 4, 
7). 
The final report notes that high levels of illiteracy in the country have made it 
necessary to design memorials so that they are accessible to everyone.  Options include 
visual art, as well as theater.  One idea for a memorial which takes the previous concerns 
into account was presented by the perpetrators.  It consists of a cement wall in a public 
place into which perpetrators would leave imprints of their hands symbolizing their 
promise to “never use these hands again to pick up a weapon and strike a fellow human 
being” (Sierra Leone TRC Ap. 4, 8).  It has yet to be created but discussion is underway 
in a forum involving all of the stakeholders, which, in itself, will contribute to the process 
of reconciliation. 
Another method of recognizing those who were lost, acknowledging wrongdoing 
on all sides, and moving forward as a community, is through ceremony.  At the close of 
the commission there was a reconciliation ceremony which “had a remarkable impact on 
the hearings, transforming the atmosphere from one of virtual crisis and farce, to one of 
emotional release and reconciliation” (Kelsall 2005, 378).  The perpetrators were given 
another opportunity to apologize which they again did on behalf of their respective 
political factions, but there appeared to be more emotion involved which pleased the 
audience.   
Between the building of permanent memorial efforts, the process of collectively 
deciding on them as well as ceremonial events which fit into the cultural norms of Sierra 
Leone, the people of Sierra Leone were able to recognize the past, which directly 
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promotes non-repetition.  As a result, my assessment of the memorial efforts is thus high.  
[Score: 3] 
b) Government accountability for reform 
The Sierra Leone TRC looked to the South African TRC for guidance, and 
replicated the South African commission’s use of information gathered to help the 
victims find their loved ones and give them a decent burial (Sierra Leone TRC Ap. 4, 4). 
Though the TRC did well in recognizing the past as depicted above, through 
memorials, the provision of blanket amnesty meant there was little legal accountability 
for individual ex-combatants.  Many chose not to testify at all, and really had no 
incentive to do so without an internal drive and trust in the commission.  They were also 
allowed to continue working in the government, as many choose to do today (Shaw 2005, 
5). 
In a survey delivered by the Campaign for Good Governance in Sierra Leone, 
participants were asked their opinion of: 
Table 6: 
“Whether the government is accountable”  
Yes No Unsure 
54.6% 13.1% 32.3% 
 
[The quality of] “The government’s fight against corruption” 
 
Very high High Average Low Very low 
23,1% 25% 35.4% 13% 3.1% 
 
[The quality of] “The government’s effort to maintain peace and reconciliation” 
 
Very high High Average Low Very low 
11.5% 26.6% 39.6% 16.9% 5.4% 
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[The quality of] “General security situation” 
 
Improved High Average Low Very low 
9.6% 31.5% 40.4% 12.7% 5.8% 
 
 (Lawrence 2009, 6-8). 
 Although the provision of unconditional amnesty does not allow the government 
to hold perpetrators (including those of the government) accountable for human rights 
violations, the public does seem to perceive an effort on the part of the government to 
pursue reform.  Each of the above questions received a majority of “average” or “high” 
responses, conveying that people have faith in the government to improve their living 
situations.  Consequently, my overall assessment for government accountability for 
reform in Sierra Leone is medium-high.  [Score: 2.5] 
 
i) State apology 
An official apology on the part of the government is symbolically significant, 
regardless of whether the political group in office was responsible for human rights 
violations or not.  It does not consist of an individual taking responsibility; rather it 
involves a promise by the current government that it will not allow the country to return 
to the dangerous state from which it has emerged.  Sierra Leone’s president throughout 
the time of the TRC, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, refused to issue a formal state apology for 
the ten year war (Shaw 2005, 5).  The TRC Chairman, Bishop Joseph Humper, supported 
the president’s statements, contributing to victim’s hesitancy to reveal their stories, and 
leading to wide-spread questioning of the unbiased nature of the TRC.  The Chairman 
went so far as to thank the pro-government militia, the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), for 
“defending the country” (Shaw 2005, 5).   
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 According to the TRC final report, the CDF were responsible for 5.9% of the 
human rights violations during this conflict, which ranks them fifth among the twelve 
perpetrator groups identified in the final report (Sierra Leone TRC Ap.1, 25).  Their 
violation types included disproportionately fewer property destruction violations, but 
were higher than many of the perpetrator groups in the areas of assault/beating, torture, 
detention, extortion, and sexual abuse.  They had the highest proportion of abductions 
among perpetrator groups (16.6%) (Sierra Leone TRC Ap. 1, 26). 
Koroma stated in a presentation to the APC: “President Kabbah made a statement 
in Makeni that the North should apologize to the rest of the country because Foday 
Sankoh, the RUF Leader has a northern name and is said to have hailed from the North. 
This unfortunate statement caused great resentment among northerners who saw it not 
only as a poor effort to disguise the real origin of the RUF but also as a deliberate attempt 
to create a regional divide and fan ethnic animosity” (Koroma 2003). 
The state chose not to apologize for the ten year war and the state decided on the 
provision for blanket amnesty.  The state has members serving in government positions 
who were known ex-combatants and have no incentive to testify and apologize for their 
actions; there is no risk of repercussion for not doing so.  While encouraging the Sierra 
Leonean people to utilize the commission and apologize for wrongdoings, the state’s 
refusal to set an example by doing so does not lend itself well to conveying a guarantee 
of non-repetition.  Therefore, my overall assessment of the quality of public apology is 
low.  [Score: 1]   
Averaging all sub-components of the category, I assign an overall score for the 
guarantee of non repetition in Sierra Leone a 2.167. 
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III) Restitution 
 
Restitution includes compensation for the victims, either paid by the government 
or the perpetrators.  In the testimonies given to the TRC, many Sierra Leoneans sought 
monetary restitution which would enable them, in turn, to educate their children.  They 
also pointed to the lack adequate facilities and opportunities for education more 
generally.  Much of this was addressed under the section of rehabilitation.   
b) Compensation 
 
i. Monetary/Benefits 
 
It took a long time for the government led reparations programs to actually get off 
the ground in Sierra Leone.  For years after the violence, there was an incongruity 
between what compensation was promised, and the lack of action that was taken to 
deliver on these promises.  Over the past few years the situation has improved.  In 
response to the recommendations of the TRC final report, the government has created the 
National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), which at the close of 2008 began 
registering those who were eligible for reparations (Turay 2008).  The commission 
focuses on amputees, victims of sexual abuse, those severely wounded, and women who 
lost husbands as a result of war and children.  Registration centers are scattered around 
Sierra Leone.  Those who come provide some sort of documentation and the lists are 
corroborated with other records such as testimonies of the TRC.  They also seek out 
known victims whose names are provided by the TRC.  This program is exclusively for 
victims who have not previously been compensated and excludes ex-combatants or 
military.  The government established a National Steering Committee which is comprised 
of 19 major stakeholders including the office of the president, victims, and civil society 
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groups to oversee the program and ensure meaningful and individualized benefit 
packages for the victims (Koroma 2009).  Hence, I rate the quality of monetary 
compensation and benefits, medium-high.  [Score: 2.5] 
ii) Community Service 
 
Community service can be utilized as a way for perpetrators to apologize for their 
actions and pay back their communities.  In Sierra Leone there was a focus on 
reintegration of ex-combatants, but it was primarily focused on providing them with a 
means to support themselves and a community which would accept them rather than 
paying back a community which they had harmed.  There were also rehabilitation 
programs for child ex-combatants which operated on a community level.  However, there 
was no significant community service program.  As was explained earlier, perpetrators 
did not typically take individual responsibility for their actions and thus there lacked a 
program for them to repay the community.  Given that there was no established 
framework for community service, the category receives a low score.  [Score: 1] 
The sub-components comprising restitution varied in quality.  The average score 
for overall Restitution in Sierra Leone is 1.75 
The comprehensive score for Restorative Justice comprised of averaging each 
sub-component score, rehabilitation, the guarantee of non-repetition, and restitution, is 
2.31 (i.e. a medium to medium-high level of restorative justice was achieved) 
Therefore, the composite Reconciliation score resulting from the average of truth 
and restorative justice, is 2.03 which signifies a medium level of reconciliation ultimately 
achieved in Sierra Leone.  (Truth-1.75, Restorative Justice- 2.31)   
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Data Analysis Summary: 
 
 The following comparative tables contrast the performance of the two countries 
analyzed and contrasted in this report.  The specific indicators rated are included in an 
overview diagram, figure 2 on page 21.   
Table 7: 
 
Truth: 
Victim and perpetrator perception of the TRC and inclination to utilize it: 
South Africa Sierra Leone 
3 1 
 
Scope and Comprehensiveness of information gathered: 
South Africa Sierra Leone 
2.5 1 
 
Access v. restriction to the TRC 
South Africa Sierra Leone 
3 3 
 
Publicity and public awareness of the TRC 
South Africa Sierra Leone 
3 2 
 
Average: 
South Africa Sierra Leone 
2.875 1.75 
 
Restorative Justice: 
Rehabilitation 
Implementation of mechanism: 
South Africa Sierra Leone 
1.5 3 
 
 Average: 
South Africa Sierra Leone 
1.5 3 
 
Guarantee of non repetition 
Memorial efforts: 
South Africa Sierra Leone 
3 3 
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Government accountability for reform: 
South Africa Sierra Leone 
2.5 2.5 
 
State apology: 
South Africa Sierra Leone 
3 1 
 
 Average: 
South Africa Sierra Leone 
2.83 2.167 
 
Restitution: 
 Monetary Compensation: 
South Africa Sierra Leone 
2 2.5 
 
 
 Community Service: 
South Africa Sierra Leone 
1 1 
 
 Average: 
South Africa Sierra Leone 
1.5 1.75 
 
 
Total truth average: 
South Africa Sierra Leone 
2.875 1.75 
 
Total restorative justice average: 
South Africa Sierra Leone 
1.94 2.31 
 
Total reconciliation average: 
South Africa Sierra Leone 
2.41 2.03 
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Critical to the goals of any TRC is the ability to achieve a balance between truth 
and justice.  The commission is expected to achieve a high score on each variable without 
one being at the expense of the other.  Simultaneously, the TRC must factor in a decision 
on amnesty: whether to use it, and in what form.  This automatically upsets the balance 
between truth and justice.  Amnesty is entered into the equation in order to yield a higher 
level of truth with the understanding that the truth will also help to bring about a higher 
level of restorative justice, while retributive justice is put to the side.  There is an 
expectation set forth that the benefits of some form of amnesty outweigh the costs, and 
that forfeiting retributive justice will not ultimately come at the expense of reconciliation. 
 The two case studies, South Africa and Sierra Leone, approached this amnesty 
decision in two different ways.  South Africa employed conditional amnesty, maintaining 
an option of retributive justice and setting up a transparent framework for the attainment 
of amnesty.  By contrast, Sierra Leone applied blanket amnesty and thereby foreclosed 
the possibility of retributive justice in favor of a collective forgiveness and an expectation 
of truth.  Reconciliation in both cases was clearly impacted by the choice of differing 
types of amnesty.  In my comparative analysis of South Africa and Sierra Leone, the four 
measures of reconciliation for which the countries had the largest score difference 
include: victim and perpetrator perception of the TRC, scope and comprehensiveness of 
information, implementation of rehabilitation mechanisms, and a state apology. 
For the first measure of truth (i.e. the victim and perpetrator perception of the 
TRC and inclination to utilize it) the South Africa TRC received a score of 3 because 
victims utilized the commission to reveal their stories and apply for restitution.  
Additionally, the provision of conditional amnesty provided a tangible incentive for 
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perpetrators to come and testify before the commission, so that both sides of the story 
were heard.  Conversely, the perpetrators in Sierra Leone, whose TRC received a score of 
1, did not typically feel compelled to testify for the commission when there was nothing 
tangible to be gained, and in fact did not trust the commission itself.  Likewise, the 
victims did not trust that the benefits of piecing together a national history (which would 
be comprised of primarily victim testimony) would outweigh the potential dangers of 
revealing other’s wrongdoings, or speaking out against certain political groups. 
 The second measure which reflected a great disparity between the two cases is the 
scope and comprehensiveness of information gathered.  This is, again, a direct result of 
the provision of amnesty.  The TRC’s ability to gather an accurate historical record 
depends upon gathering accounts from representative groups.  If the perpetrators are not 
inclined or motivated to testify, then a comprehensive perspective is absent from the 
record.  Additionally, the South African TRC was able to subpoena witnesses or 
perpetrators which would then want to testify in exchange for amnesty and in order to 
avoid punishment.  These differences resulted in South Africa’s TRC score of 2.5 versus 
Sierra Leone’s TRC score of 1. 
 In terms of a state apology, South Africa’s TRC received a score of 3 as a result 
of both leaders (during and after the apartheid), offering apologies to the people of South 
Africa.  Sierra Leone’s TRC, which received a 1, maintained many of the same 
government officials who were in place during the conflict and who did not take 
individual responsibility for their actions.  Nor did they have an incentive to do so, as a 
result of the blanket amnesty.   
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The final significant difference between the scores results from a difference in the 
implementation of a rehabilitation mechanism.  South Africa scored 1.5 while Sierra 
Leone scored 3.  Rehabilitation is an issue which is crucial looking forward.  South 
Africa clearly excelled in gathering truth but Sierra Leone ultimately scored higher in the 
area of restorative justice.  In future commissions, these two issues need to be addressed 
simultaneously.  Sierra Leone’s efforts toward rehabilitation and the reunification of its 
people proved to be more comprehensive and effective than that of South Africa.  The 
measures in which South Africa scored lower in this area include rehabilitation 
mechanisms and restitution.  This is, in part, a result of a lack of follow through on the 
part of the state.   
A low point of both TRCs was community service.  This is a powerful mechanism 
which contributes to restitution and to restorative justice but was overlooked in both 
cases.  It is not as concrete as monetary restitution, but many aspects of the TRC are 
symbolic (such as apologies and memorials) and these can be equally if not more 
powerful and lasting.  Looking forward, community service offers unexplored potential 
and should be further investigated as a means to improve a restorative justice score. 
 
Conclusion: 
Ultimately, a TRC is a tool of transitional justice, meant to address wide spread 
human rights violations, offer justice to the victims, and ultimately provide peace and 
reconciliation to the state so that the people may unite and move forward as one (ICTJ 
2010, What is Transitional Justice).  A TRC is specifically mandated to compile a 
complete historical truth and offer some form of justice (most typically restorative).  
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According to my research, the provision of conditional amnesty utilized by South Africa 
revealed a high level of truth while maintaining a medium level of restorative justice.  
Therefore, South Africa’s reconciliation score surpassed the score resulting from Sierra 
Leone’s blanket amnesty, and proved conditional amnesty to be the better option.  
However, South Africa does need to focus on the follow-through of restorative measures 
for them to adequately take the place of retributive justice.  Should this be accomplished, 
they could achieve a high score in both areas and thereby attain a high level of 
reconciliation.   
The South Africa TRC had the benefit of greater funding, more media attention, 
and Archbishop Desmond Tutu as a charismatic leader of the commission; and yet Sierra 
Leone was able to achieve a higher score in terms of restorative justice.  Sierra Leone 
compromised the level of truth and trust the commission achieved by employing blanket 
amnesty in place of a conditional amnesty approach.  However, Sierra Leone 
implemented better rehabilitation and compensation mechanisms.  The approaches of 
South Africa and Sierra Leone can be joined in future commissions, by utilizing 
conditional amnesty while focusing on restorative justice techniques, so as to best address 
both components of reconciliation. 
Overall, neither TRC was perfect; neither completely achieved the ultimate goal 
of reconciliation.  However, important steps were taken, many of which will set a 
precedent for future commissions while others will provide lessons to be learned.  
Significant aspects of these two commissions which future commissions could learn from 
include South Africa’s approach to the TRC and conditional amnesty, which involved 
three different committees and worked cooperatively with an external prosecution 
 76 
mechanism.  This was a novel approach and provided additional organization and 
structure, as well as the ability to reach out to the entire population and secure a 
comprehensive truth.  Looking forward, Kenya is expected to establish a Truth, Justice, 
and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC).  Their Commission of Inquiry has highly 
advised that this include a prosecution mechanism in order to achieve the “justice” aspect 
(ICTJ 2010, Kenya).  It is expected that Kenya will take many of the lessons learned from 
South Africa’s TRC, but it will be interesting to note their approach to restorative justice, 
whether they can fill in South Africa’s deficiencies.   
Additionally, there is frequently debate surrounding whether heads of state should 
apologize for the actions of a state whether or not they were directly responsible.  In 
South Africa there was considerable doubt surrounding the first diplomatic election and 
whether the government would really turn over power.  The apology from the old and 
new governments was a milestone and set the stage for change and acceptance.  Finally, 
the popular support of Sierra Leone’s rehabilitation mechanisms and the effort to assist 
and reintegrate all parties involved in the conflict (perpetrators, victims, witnesses, and 
child ex-combatants) should surely be transferred to future commissions.  
It is clear that a high score in one area of reconciliation is not sufficient to offset a 
low score in another.  Conditional amnesty proves to be the best approach in terms of 
gathering truth, which automatically raises the level of restorative justice achieved; 
however, it alone is unsatisfactory.  Truth and justice are inherently intertwined, and there 
needs to be a concerted effort toward both areas for reconciliation to be realized.   
 
 
 
 
 77 
Appendix A: List of Abbreviations 
 
 
 
AC  Amnesty Committee 
AFRC  Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
ANC  African National Congress 
APC  All Peoples Congress   
ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring 
Group 
HRVC  Human Rights Violations Committee 
ICTJ  International Center for Transitional Justice 
NP  National Party 
NPRC  National Provisional Ruling Council 
PAC  Pan-African Congress 
PNDC  Provisional National Defence Council 
RRC  Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee   
RUF  Revolutionary United Front 
SPSL  Special Court for Sierra Leone 
TRC  Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
UN  United Nations 
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
USIP  United States Institute of Peace   
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Appendix B:  South Africa: Map 
 
 
 
 
(Central Intelligence Agency, South Africa) 
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Appendix C:  Sierra Leone: Map 
 
 
 
 
(Central Intelligence Agency, Sierra Leone) 
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Appendix D:  South Africa: Conflict Timeline 
 
1652- Dutch East India Company settled on the Cape of Good Hope and formed the first 
permanent white settlement 
 Together with the other settling countries (Germany and France) they became 
known as the Afrikaner 
1700s- Dutch (known as Trekboers) expand their territory for farming and in so doing 
move into the territory of the Koikhoi and San tribes 
1785-1795- Trekboers are responsible for killing roughly 2500 San people and taking 
about 700 (primarily children) into custody to become slaves 
1795- British take control of Cape Town sparking conflict with the Afrikaner (or 
Trekboers) 
1836- “Great Trek” of the Afrikaner north into Zulu territory 
1852 and 1854- Boar republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State were created 
1870- Discovery of diamonds in Kimberly (Boar territory) 
1886- Discovery of gold in Boar territory 
1880-1881, and 1899-1902- Anglo-Boar Wars 
May 1910- British colonies plus the two Boar republics created South Africa 
1948- National Party (NP) won all-white election 
 Apartheid laws were created 
1950- classification system enacted 
1951- Bantu Authorities Act created “homelands” 
1953- Public Safety Act and Criminal Law Amendment Act were passed 
1960- State of emergency declared in response to protests of black South Africans 
 Mass political violence and corruption followed for the next 25 years 
May 1961- South Africa declared its self a republic, independent of Britain 
1986- Government began talks with Mandela 
February 1989- F.W. DeKlerk became president 
1990- DeKlerk un-banned the ANC, PAC, and other anti-apartheid parties 
1991- last “pillars of apartheid” were eliminated 
December 1993- new constitution was created 
1994- First non-racial elections 
May 10, 1994- Nelson Mandela became president 
December 1995-2002- Commission of Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) was mandated 
February 3, 1997- new permanent constitution entered into force 
2003- TRC final report was released publicly 
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Appendix E: Sierra Leone: Conflict Timeline 
 
1652- First freed slaves brought to Sierra Leone 
1787- British helped 400 more slaves to Sierra Leone 
1792- Freetown was established as British colony 
Thousands more freed slaves would be brought to Sierra Leone 
1951- Decolonization in the works 
1961- Sierra Leone became independent with the British Commonwealth 
1962- Sir Milton Margai, Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) was elected Prime minister 
1966- Sir Milton Margai dies and is replaced by half-brother, Sir Albert Margai 
March 1967- All Peoples Congress (APC) won plurality of seats in parliament 
April 1968- Siaka Stevens (APC leader) was declared by Parliament- Prime minister 
1978- Constitution was amended to accept only APC as a political party 
October 1985- APC (by Steven’s suggestion) named Maj. Gen. Joseph Saidu Momoh 
president in a one-party referendum 
March 1991- Revolutionary United Front (RUF) began attacks on the eastern boarder of 
Sierra Leone to gain control of the diamond mines and thereby pushed back Sierra 
Leone army  
April 29, 1992- Capt Valentine Strasser initiated a military coup which resulted in the  
exile of Momoh to Guinea and established National Provisional Ruling Council 
(NPRC) as ruling party of Sierra Leone 
1995- RUF controlled most of the western side of Sierra Leone and was moving toward 
Freetown 
 NPRC hired mercenaries to drive back RUF forces 
April 1996- NPRC handed power over to civilian government, at which point Ahmad Tejan 
Kabbah, a UN diplomat, won the Presidency 
May 25, 1997- Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) overthrew President Kabbah 
and proceeded to invite members of RUF into the new government 
March 1998- Nigerian led Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) overthrew AFRC and reinstated President Kabbah 
 This instigated much violence on the part of the RUF in Freetown 
January 6 1999- rebels attacked Freetown 
 ECOMOG retaliated including them as active members of the conflict 
July 7 1999- President Kabbah and RUF leader Sankoh signed Lomé Peace Agreement 
1999-2000- United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) established 
2000- RUF violated Lomé Peace Agreement, held UNAMSIL members hostage 
May 8, 2000- Members of RUF killed 20 anti-RUF demonstrators 
 Sankoh and various members of RUF were arrested and removed from government 
positions 
November 2000- new peace agreement signed in Abuja 
 Guinean forces attacked RUF bases in response to their attacks in Guinea 
May 2001- second Abuja Agreement for peace was signed 
disarmament proceeded 
January 18, 2002- President Kabbah officially declared the civil war over 
May 2002- President Kabbah was re-elected 
Summer 2002- Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) opened 
 Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) opened 
October 2004- TRC released final report 
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Appendix F: List of TRCs 
 
Truth 
Commission 
 
Duration 
 
Amnesty? 
  
Solomon Islands  
2009-2010 
(expected) 
blanket(mostly) amnesty, no self 
incrimination 
Kenya   2 years anticipated 
conditional amnesty, works with 
prosecution 
Ecuador 07  2007-2009 
mandate-no amnesty, 
results?  
Liberia   2006-2009 ~ 
partial amnesty-children and more 
minor crimes 
Morocco   2004-2005 
blanket amnesty-don't name alleged 
perpetrators 
Paraguay   2004-2008 investigate--> contribute to prosecution 
Algeria   2003-2005 
conditional amnesty, almost 
blanket  
Chile 03   2003-2005 
blanket self-
amnesty   
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 2003-2007    blanket amnesty- for all but the worst 
Ghana   2003-2004 
blanket self-amnesty built into 
constitution 
Sierra Leone  2002-2004 ~ 
blanket amnesty-for those not in 
tribunal 
Timor-Lest (East Timor) 2002-2005 ~ amnesty for minor crimes  
Serbia and Montenegro 2002-2003 not impartial, disbanded  
Peru 01   2001-2003 ~ no amnesty, can refer to prosecution 
Panama   2001-2002 
blanket amnesty because can't 
conclude responsibilities 
Cote d'Ivoire  2000-2001 ~ violence followed then amnesty-03 
South Korea  2000-2004 
investigates, names perpetrators for 
prosecution 
Uruguay   2000-2002 ~ blanket amnesty- Expiry Law  
Nigeria   1999-2002 investigatory   
Rwanda 99  1999-today 
no amnesty, gacaca-concession 
program 
Guatemala  1997-1999 
no real prosecutions, perpetrators 
names not given 
Ecuador 96  1996-1997 not completed, see 07  
South Africa  1995-2002 ~ conditional amnesty-if full disclosure 
Burundi   1995-1996 ~ 
provisional amnesty- for all but the 
worst 
Germany 95  1995-1998 investigative- no amnesty provision? 
Haiti   1994-1996 investigative, prosecutions in the works 
Sri Lanka   1995-2000 evidence can't be used in prosecutions 
Ethiopia   
1993-
2007(?) ~ 
no amnesty- investigates and 
prosecutes 
Rwanda 93  1993  
no prosecutions- still problems in gov.-
94 
El Salvador  1992-1993 ~ 
blanket amnesty, even though 
unconstitutional. 
Germany 92  1992-1994 
investigative- no amnesty provision? 
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Chad   1991-1992 
amnesty? Investigation, but little done 
after 
 
Chile 90 
  
 
1990-1991 
 
~ 
 
blanket amnesty-old regime still has 
influence 
Nepal 90   1990-1991 
investigative No 
prosecutions?   
Peru 86   1986-1988 
ineffective with political influence-see 
2001 
Uganda 86  1986-1994 investigative   
Argentina   1983-1984 
Essentially blanket 
amnesty   
Zimbabwe   1983-1984 blanket amnesty, no formal report 
Bolivia   1982-1984 
only investigated disappeared- 
underfunded  
Brazil   1979-1982 blanket amnesty- but unofficial project 
Uganda 74  1974      
         
Mozambique Protocol VI Cease-fire Protocol VI. (3) all prisoners, except for  
  collective amnesty for all sides 
those being held for ordinary crimes, 
shall  
     be released by the parties  
         
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2001  
little diversity, ended without producing 
final  
     report or recommendations  
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